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Introduction 
 
Intergovernmental trusts, or trust funds, have been around for a few decades, grounded on a 
proliferation of international agreements. Yet, surprisingly, none of these agreements, nor the 
institutional law of international organisations acting as trustees thereto, have attempted even 
once to set out the legal nature of these arrangements. The relevant protagonists are content to 
simply establish them by means of agreement on the basis of certain underlying assumptions 
that are taken for granted. State practice is in fact so consistent and uniform in respect of 
these underlying assumptions, despite the absence of formal definitions, that a claim of 
customary international law would be well justified; this potential for a customary nature is 
amply debated on the basis of the consistent practice of States in respect of trust agreements, 
albeit only with regard to particular characteristics. The absence of definitions by the two 
main actors in the trust relationship, i.e., donors and trustees, is hardly conspicuous, given 
that it avoids limiting and restrictively delineating the range of operations and relationships 
encompassed within the trust paradigm. In this manner, one is in the dark as to whether the 
trust relationship is governed by the international law of agency, or whether it constitutes a 
sui generis arrangement that lacks agency qualities altogether. Equally, if indeed of a sui 
generis nature, it is uncertain whether the general law of privileges and immunities applies to 
trusts that are not also international organisations and whether the donors owe extra-
contractual duties to third parties. Nonetheless, and despite the absence of a clear framework, 
the proliferation of trust entities in the past twenty years clearly suggests that the relevant 
sovereign actors form an interpretative community, in that they share common 
understandings about the culture and the environment within which trusts are set up and 
moreover interpret these underlying assumptions in a wholly uniform manner.
1
 Although the 
contemporary trust vehicle was not intended to serve merely a limited number of usages, its 
employment in the international sphere serves mainly the following functions: natural 
disasters, fiscal emergencies, long-term financial stabilisation, poverty alleviation and 
environmental financing.  
 The smooth, un-problematic and universally consistent application of the 
intergovernmental trust paradigm in the midst of a jungle of agreements between the relevant 
actors and their implementation in domestic legal systems may also be explained by reference 
to so-called Global Administrative Law (GAL). This generally posits that the biggest part of 
global regulatory governance may be viewed as administration and that the relevant 
implementing authorities at both domestic and inter-State level form a global administrative 
space that is inextricably linked.
2
 Commentators argue that this global administrative space 
includes also public-private partnerships that are not controlled by a central executive 
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authority and are not predicated on formal legal structures. It is posited that a common 
normative character, of a fundamentally administrative nature, unites otherwise disparate 
areas of governance and in this manner the transparency of the international regulatory bodies 
is better guaranteed because of the many intermediate layers from the top executive echelons 
to the minor domestic implementing agencies.
3
 These observations closely reflect the trust 
paradigm analysed in this article and are extremely useful in explaining how and why it 
operates the way it does from the international to the domestic sphere. Nonetheless, my 
objective in this study is to map the relevant relationships at the international level and not to 
identify the modalities pertaining to the chain of administration and hence GAL does not play 
a direct part in this analysis. 
At this early point a definition of the fundamental characteristics of intergovernmental 
trusts may be attempted by reference to the legal instruments employed by States and 
international organisations. This consists of a contractual relationship between a donor and a 
trustee for the benefit of a future class of beneficiaries, or an intended purpose, whereby the 
beneficiaries are distinct from the persons of the trustee or donors and the trustee moreover 
possesses sufficient independence from the donors to carry out its mandate, although the 
latter’s authority over the trust’s decision-making processes may be severely limited. 
Furthermore, the legal person of the trust is distinct from that of the donors, as well as from 
the other assets of the trustee, albeit the assets of the trust pass to the ownership of the trustee 
throughout the duration of the trust relationship. Finally, beneficiaries do not possess 
equitable rights against the trustee or the trust property, save through a subsequent grant 
agreement and the donors are not liable against third parties or the beneficiaries, except 
where an unlawful act may be directly attributed to them. The issue of donor and trustee 
liability, and its lack thereof, is central in the rationale of intergovernmental trusts and will be 
explored and challenged more fully below. In any event, this is perhaps a much longer 
definition than what this author would have wished, but it encompasses all the essential 
elements of the necessary characteristics of intergovernmental trusts. 
 One may argue that given the extensive civil law and common law jurisprudence on 
trusts we should be able, at the very least, to transplant some of their basic elements into their 
international law counterparts, or alternatively use domestic notions as interpretative tools. 
This is not a new idea and Judge Fitzmaurice even attempted a similar analogy with common 
law trusts in his Separate Opinion in the South West Africa cases, in order to explain certain 
aspects of the trusteeship system.
4
 However, as the reader will come to realise in the course 
of this article, not only are the two legal traditions themselves at odds on the nature of trusts, 
but the intergovernmental model itself is also quite distinct. This is not to say that general 
principles of trust law are of no use; rather, although they cannot be employed to explain the 
legal nature of the intergovernmental trust per se, they are certainly useful for elaborating the 
duties of the trustee to the donors, among others,
5
 although this is a matter well beyond the 
scope of the present study. Ascertaining the legal nature of intergovernmental trusts and their 
precise place in general international law is much more than a theoretical exercise. Rather, it 
helps us to distinguish those abusive or disguised trusts that would otherwise be subject to the 
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law of agency or the domestic laws of pertinent States, particularly where they would 
otherwise be governed by securities and general commercial law. Moreover, it would 
alleviate concerns that intergovernmental trusts can invest their assets in international 
markets or transact with private entities without being subject to securities and investment 
laws, laws regulating anti-competitive practices, or that they can impose interventionist terms 
on recipient States without even incurring any liabilities. At present, their perceived 
privileges and immunities are interpreted under this light, particularly because no affected 
entity has as yet challenged these assumptions; this is even true in respect of a trust  vehicle 
that is in all likelihood abusive of the trust paradigm. .
6
 Although I will not be addressing all 
of these questions in the present article, I am convinced that an elaboration of the legal nature 
of these trusts and their place in general international law is fundamental to any further 
enquiry.
7
 
 From a methodological point of view, although the fundamental principles of 
intergovernmental trusts underlie all their operations, because these are administered by 
independent trustees the modalities for enforcing these principles in practice are premised on 
the institutional law of each and every trustee. Thus, a transversal approach is adopted in this 
article in respect of the general underlying principles alone. With regard to the application of 
these principles by the trustees, the discrete practice of each trustee, along with his 
institutional law, contractual practices, etc, will be necessarily analysed separately. To these  
matters, a transversal approach would be ill-advised.  
 
 
 
The Fundamental Elements of the Intergovernmental Trust Relationship 
 
Traces of the trust relationship are found in Ancient Greek law, albeit its most concise 
formulation in antiquity was encompassed under the Roman law concepts of the fiducia and 
the fideicommissum. In the Roman law of property the fiducia was employed to denote the 
trust transfer of property, accompanied always with a further agreement, the pactum fiduciae. 
On the basis of this agreement the trustee promised the settlor that he would use the property 
for the fulfilment of a purpose and that he would later return it to him. In case the terms of the 
pactum fiduciae were not adhered by the trustee, the settlor possessed a special claim against 
him, the actio fiducia directa, which was predicated solely on its contractual basis and was 
therefore a claim in personam and thus could not be directed against a third person to which 
the trustee may have transferred the settlor’s property.8 Whereas the fiducia is more akin to 
the civil law concept of trust, it is the fideicommissum that is professed by common lawyers 
as being the forerunner to the common law notion.
9
 The affinity of the fideicommissum with 
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the common law concept of trusts is further explained by reference to the missio in rem 
remedy, which entitled the settlor to claim possession and demesne of the trust property 
against a third person to whom the trust property was transferred.
10
 Unlike the proprietal 
remedy (in rem) available to beneficiaries in the common law on account of their equitable 
interest, as developed by the courts of chancery, the missio in rem is not of this nature; its 
exercise was dependent on a prior personal suit against the trustee.
11
 Civil law jurisdictions 
adopted the Roman fiducia model (the basic form of which is the treuhand) which was 
wholly based on contract with the aim of securing a claim belonging to the trustee, or to 
secure the rights of the trustee in the administration of the settlor’s trust property.12 This 
development was largely predicated on judicial interpretations that culminated in cementing 
the rights of the trustee over the property and similarly limiting the ability of the settlor to 
make claims over the trust property by invoking unjust enrichment.
13
 The general position in 
the common law is that the trust is a creature of equity and that the mandate of the trustee is 
not at all predicated on contract. Moreover, far from being a third party in the relationship 
between the settlor and the trustee, the beneficiary enjoys rights in rem over the trust property 
against all persons and rights in personam against the trustee in his administration of the 
property. 
 The aforementioned trust notions were certainly influential in the formulation of the 
trusteeship system under chapters XII and XIII of the UN Charter, as well as its predecessor 
under Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, the so-called Mandates.
14
 Judge McNair 
even enunciated what he believed where the general principles common to the domestic laws 
of nations in respect of trust funds and applied these to explain the trusteeship relationship in 
the UN Charter and the mandates systems. These general principles were held by Judge 
Fitzmaurice to consist of the following: 
 
a) that the control of the trustee over the property is limited in one way or another; he is not in the position of the 
normal complete owner, who can do what he likes with his own, because he is precluded from administering the 
property for his own personal benefit; 
 
b) that the trustee is under some kind of legal obligation, based on confidence and conscience, to carry out the 
trust or mission confided to him for the benefit of another person or for some public purpose;  
 
c) that any attempt by one of these persons to absorb the property entrusted to him into his own patrimony 
would be illegal and would be prevented by the law.
15
 
 
The trust and mandate systems were clearly designed to fulfil a trust function whereby the 
international community (through the UN, where applicable)  represented the settlor/donor, 
the local population the beneficiary of the administration, whereas the governing entity was 
deemed to represent the temporary  administrator, that is the trustee. The relationship 
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between the settlor and the trustee was borne and sustained by agreement, in which the 
mandate lacked perpetuity and the trustee was merely an administrator that possessed no right 
of ownership over the territory concerned.
16
 As enriching as these principles may be in our 
discussion of contemporary intergovernmental trusts, they fail to fully encapsulate many of 
the fundamental characteristics of this international sui generis relationship. For one thing, 
the trustee was incumbent with concrete obligations against the beneficiaries and the 
international community as a whole, in accordance with Article 76 of the UN Charter.
17
 
Secondly, the beneficiaries could formally petition the settlor and moreover possessed 
enforceable rights under the laws of the territory and the laws of the trustee pertinent to that 
territory. Thirdly, the trusteeship and mandate system was restricted to a single type of 
relationship that concerned the administration of territory. Fourthly, there existed no 
understanding among the relevant actors that the trustee and the settlor could by mutual 
agreement limit potential liability arising from the process of administration. 
At its very core, the intergovernmental trust consists of a tripartite relationship in 
which the relevant actors possess asymmetric rights and duties. At the apex sits the appointed 
trustee who contracts directly with the donors and from which originate the mandate of the 
trustee and his powers over the allocated resources. The purpose of this contractual 
arrangement is to ultimately disburse the trust’s assets to a class of beneficiaries, which are 
designated in general terms by the agreement between the donors and the trustee. Whereas 
the donors are not, and in fact do not wish to be, contractually linked  to the beneficiaries, the 
trustee by necessity is, albeit only following the adoption of a mutual disbursement 
agreement. In this manner, the trust vehicle serves to divest the donors from all liability 
towards third parties; or at least, this is the idea and the shared assumption between donors 
and trustees in all the surveyed trust instruments. Were the donors to contribute financial 
resources to the same recipients without the medium of the trust, they would naturally incur 
contractual liabilities, which they would understandably rather avoid.
18
 This is not, however, 
the sole reason for the existence of intergovernmental trust funds. An additional benefit for 
the donors stemming from the trust vehicle is the assurance that an experienced trustee will 
undertake the whole range of managerial, investment and implementation functions related to 
the trust under consideration. This mechanism is certainly cost-effective for donors, 
particularly where the trustees, as is the case with the World Bank and the UN, have first-
hand experience and physical presence in the country where the funds are to be disbursed and 
thus the donor need not duplicate existing modalities, engage staff or enter into other 
commitments. Moreover, whereas a unilateral donation may be perceived as neo-imperialistic 
or as an invasion of the target State’s sovereignty, the medium of an impartial international 
organisation or of a development bank would avoid bringing about such accusations. Thus, 
the trust is viewed as a political enabler of international aid, quite apart from its humanitarian 
dimension. 
 The trustee, itself an international legal person, is liable to the donors for the 
performance of his pertinent duties, which are increasingly becoming clearer through the 
consistent practice of States in this expanding field. This consistent practice relates not to the 
legal nature of pledges and their disbursement, but to the contractual undertakings between 
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donors and trustees which is clearly aimed at creating binding relations. The trustee’s 
liabilities and powers over the trust’s assets and operations are dependent on the trust’s 
power-sharing arrangements between itself and the donors and from any limitations
19
 arising 
from their mutual contractual relations. The final entity in the tripartite trust relationship, that 
is the beneficiary, possesses no rights equivalent to remedies in rem (otherwise known as 
proprietary rights, or rights of equitable interest or of equitable ownership) or in personam  
against the trustee. This is a clear and express presumption in all trust agreements. A possible 
avenue for circumventing this absence of remedies may be sought by invoking the fiduciary 
duties owed by the trustee to the donor. In this case, beneficiaries can attack the trustee’s 
disbursement policies and enforcement through the person of the donor by arguing that since 
the proper discharge of the function of disbursement belongs within the range of fiduciary 
duties owed by the trustee to the donors, the failure of the trustee in this regard entails his 
contractual failure to comply with his fiduciary duties. This alternative assumes, rather 
wishfully, that the donor will agree to turn against the trustee. 
Exceptionally, beneficiaries can turn against the trustee following the adoption of a 
grant/disbursement agreement with the trustee, claiming thereafter contractual remedies. In 
my opinion, beneficiaries can also turn against the donors where the latter have played a part 
in the management of the trust and have caused a wrongful act as a result. This presumption 
will be explained more fully in a later section. Although it is clear that the fundamental 
premise of the trust model is to deliver financial assistance by limiting the liabilities of both 
the donors and the trustee, some indirect avenues are available to prospective beneficiaries. 
This is true in respect of international compensation trust funds,
20
 particularly those endowed 
with a judicial or quasi-judicial dimension, as well as with regard to other specialised trusts 
whereby the beneficiaries are named by a clearly distinguishable class and on the basis of 
which they constitute numerus clausus.
21
 Equally, the concept of beneficiary may be 
legitimately expanded to encompass persons, or groups, within a country that are in receipt of 
funds from an intergovernmental trust. In this manner, said persons or groups can petition the 
trustee through his institutional organs, where applicable, such as the IBRD’s Inspection 
Panel.
22
 In any event, these beneficiary remedies are limited in both nature and scope. This 
dimension significantly differentiates intergovernmental trusts from their civil and common 
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law counterparts in respect of which the existence of equitable beneficiary rights constitutes 
the cornerstone of the trust relationship.
23
 
 The precise legal nature of the intergovernmental trust relationship has never been 
explained or defined in any instrument. While it is true that the intention of the donors and 
the trustee is to limit their respective liabilities vis-à-vis third parties and beneficiaries, why 
should one accept this contention absent a framework convention on intergovernmental trusts 
and sometimes in defiance of general international law? The obvious response seems to be 
that the basic tenets of donor agreements and trust operational practices are so consistent and 
uniform that ultimately give rise to a customary sui generis paradigm. I am in agreement with 
this contention because the aforementioned principles are common to all of the more than 
3,000 trust agreements currently in force worldwide. Nonetheless, this does not explain why 
the purported trust relationship does not amount to an agency or a proxy. An agency may be 
set up by formal agreement between two international legal persons (whether States or 
intergovernmental organisations)
24
 by the implicit operation of tacit acquiescence, or through 
the endorsement otherwise of particular action.
25
 The most poignant outcome of the 
international law of agency is that the principal is deemed liable for the acts of the agent, as if 
he had committed these himself. The concept of agency per se does not feature in the text of 
the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility. Instead, Article 8 of the Articles was intended 
to resolve the issue of attribution in determining State responsibility, but Sarooshi reluctantly 
concedes that one may conflate agency and attribution in the same provision with the 
consequence that “control appears sufficient to establish an agency relationship”.26 Trust 
funds under international law are sui generis legal vehicles that although share some of the 
characteristics of agencies, are in fact very different creatures altogether. Firstly, the donors 
do not confer any existing State powers to the trustee and through him to the trust entity; the 
mandate relates to functions and not powers. The trust contract establishes a new set of rights 
and obligations and it is not intended to alter existing legal relationships. Even so, the 
formation of an agency  would still have been possible, save for the fact that all existing trust 
agreements clearly stipulate that the agent bears no liability for the acts or omissions of the 
donors. This exclusion of liability is precisely intended to dissolve any ambiguity as to 
whether in fact an agency exists and some agreements have exceptionally gone as far as 
expressly rejecting the existence of any agency relationship from the very outset.
27
 Thirdly, 
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this would be a rare occurrence. Intergovernmental trust funds have been set up where the 
body of donors does in fact exercise many of the powers of trustee and where an independent 
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28
 Fourthly, unlike the agent who may be liable with  his 
own assets, on top of those of the principal, the existing structure of intergovernmental trust 
funds suggests that in the majority of cases the trust vehicle is an entity independent from the 
assets of the trustee and itself bears its own liabilities. This is certainly true in respect of trust 
funds managed by international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, but it is not 
the case with funds managed by the body of donors, especially where the trust does not enjoy 
a distinct international legal personality.   
 A meticulous study of trust agreements reveals the existence, without exception, of 
the following legally binding duties bestowed on trustees; the duty to keep separate accounts, 
so long as this is specifically requested by the donors and is in the best interests of the trust; 
the duty of care; the duty to invest and re-invest the trust’s assets in cases of revolving trusts; 
the duty to avoid conflicts of interest and self-dealing, and; the duty to report to the donors 
and provide them with regular financial audits. The trustee himself is entitled to a fee for his 
services, as well as administrative cost recovery, the amounts for which are generally agreed 
in advance between the parties. Let us now examine some of these fundamental 
characteristics of intergovernmental trust entities in more detail. 
 
 
 
The Contractual Basis of Trusts 
 
As has already been briefly explained, the position in the common law is that trusts are set up 
by means of appointment or statute, but certainly not contractually. The situation is different 
in respect to the Romano-Germanic trust model, whose constitution rests on agreement 
between the relevant parties. It is clear from the aforementioned discussion that the 
transposition of either model, whether of the civil or common law-type, in the international 
legal sphere is only of minor legal value because in both systems the beneficiaries are entitled 
to some enforceable rights, unlike intergovernmental trusts, as already explained. The 
contractual basis of intergovernmental trust funds is fully confirmed by extensive practice 
that knows of no exceptions. This does not mean that the UN Security Council is powerless 
to set up a trust and endow it with particular powers, given that it has already done so and 
generally enjoys this power as a result of its implied powers; rather, the Council has never 
obliged UN member States parties to contribute assets to such funds, nor forcefully appointed 
a member as trustee. Nonetheless, the contractual nature of trusts should be not be determined 
strictly in terms of the binding authority of the instrument employed, but in accordance with 
the degree of consent afforded by the participating actors. It should be noted from the outset 
that the contractual nature of intergovernmental trusts encompasses two distinct agreements. 
As will be explained in a later section, the agreement setting up the trust, if any, is separate 
from a subsequent bilateral agreement between trustee and donor by which the latter consents 
to his participation thereto and through which he formally pledges the amount of his 
contribution. 
                                                                                                                                                        
create a trust and not a “general partnership, limited partnership, joint stock association, corporation, bailment or 
other”. 
28
 As is the case with the 2004 Global Crop Diversity Trust Constitution, wherein the contributing States assume 
the role of trustee.  
 Given the limited number of available trustees to these vehicles, each has adopted its 
own institutional rules and policies in order to agree with potential donors on the modality of 
trust relationships. The varieties of trust instruments and the legal forms they assume does not 
necessarily imply inconsistent practice or significant deviations from the trust paradigm as 
defined above. On the contrary, these variations are the direct result of the trustees’ efforts to 
harmonise trust instruments with their own institutional law, which is substantially older than, 
and predates, the practice of intergovernmental trusts. The fundamental principles permeating 
all trusts are the same everywhere. It is instructive that in the context of the League of 
Nations’ mandate system the participants recognised more than one legal form of territorial 
administration. Thus, C-class mandates, under Article 22, such as that endorsed by the 1919 
UK-New Zealand-Australia Agreement on Nauru, clearly provided for administration “under 
the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of its territory”. This range of possible 
mandates did not render the basic mandate relationship inconsistent and this is true even 
when, as in the case of the 1919 Nauru Agreement, the parties contracted to exclude other 
League members from equal opportunities in the fields of commerce and trade, in violation of 
Article 22.
29
 Equally, were a particular trust entity to deviate from a principle whose nature 
was merely permissive, such as  through the granting of enforceable beneficiary rights, its 
practice cannot be deemed abusive of the general paradigm. Nonetheless, despite the 
aforementioned consistency in respect of the fundamental principles underlying 
intergovernmental trusts, it is only through an examination of the institutional law of each 
one of these that the reader can appreciate the finer intricacies of the emerging trust 
paradigm. In much the same way, although no doubt should exist as to the emergence of a 
corpus of fundamental principles underlying the institutional law of international 
organisations, it is only through the particular law of each one of these organisations that the 
general principles make any sense. 
In accordance with its operational policies, the World Bank, when acting as a trustee, 
enters into framework agreements with the donors.
30
 Under said policies donors are required 
to enter into an additional Trust Fund Administration Agreement on the basis of which the 
Bank recovers its costs to manage and administer the trust fund.
31
 The elaborate mechanism 
by which the above agreements are drafted, signed and implemented, as well as the absence 
of any “lighter” – non-binding – alternative, suggests that the intention of the World Bank is 
to conclude binding treaties with contributing States, rather than contracts subject to private 
law. In fact, the Bank, where possible, enters into standard binding agreements with all 
donors to a particular trust fund in order to harmonise results and reduce cost.
32
 The Bank’s 
Standard Provisions applicable to each trust fund are expressly stated in each Letter of 
Agreement as forming an integral part thereof.
33
 In respect of the Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF), to which the IBRD acts as trustee, much like other treaties, the GEF 
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Instrument
34
 requires that participating entities deposit an instrument of participation to the 
GEF Secretariat. For States parties this is tantamount to an instrument of ratification, since it 
is required that this instrument “be signed on behalf of the Government by a duly authorised 
representative thereof”.35 The deposit of this instrument is required only once. The second 
contractual relationship between the GEF trustee and participating States is that premised on 
the instrument of commitment,
36
 through which participating entities make their pledges to 
the GEF.
37
 Both contracts create rights and duties for the signatories, such as the obligation to 
pay the pledge and the right to sit in the GEF’s Council and Assembly, among others.  
Further proof that these agreements constitute treaties and not memoranda of 
understanding that generally lack an intention to commit is demonstrated by the language 
employed in these instruments. For example, in the Agreement between the EC Commission 
and the World Bank for the ASEM Trust Fund of 23 December 1998, it is stated in relevant 
part: “We are pleased to confirm the intention of the Commission to make available to the 
World Bank the sum of …”. Equally, “the contribution shall be used for the purposes …” and 
“the Commission shall deposit…”, whereas “the Bank shall make available to the competent 
bodies of the EC, upon request, all relevant information…”.38  
In cases where the UN Secretariat acts as a trustee to a trust fund, although not always 
consistently, donors may be requested to engage in a binding agreement with the UN, but 
there is no such institutional requirement. Article 6 of the Terms of Reference of the UN 
Special Missions Trust Fund requires that: 
 
The making of a pledge and its acceptance are to be recorded in an exchange of letters, or if deemed appropriate, 
in a formal agreement.
39
 
 
This provision, which is a verbatim reflection of the relevant paragraph in the UN Secretary-
General’s Bulletin on the Establishment and Management of Trust Funds,40 refers to the form 
of the pledge only and not the contractual modality for the participation of the donor in the 
trust fund. The latter relationship is distinguished in the Bulletin and in the case of general 
trust funds it does even require a written agreement. Such an agreement is required only when 
it “is deemed necessary”,41 albeit no further guidance exists in elaboration of this 
requirement. On the contrary, technical cooperation trust funds always require the conclusion 
of a written agreement.
42
 It is clear, therefore, that general trust funds set up by the Secretariat 
and the General Assembly do not require a formal arrangement between the donors and the 
United Nations, let alone a treaty. This practice is no doubt part of the UN’s budgetary legacy 
of failing to treat pledges as binding promises that give rise to a legal obligation. It is only at 
the moment of receipt or deposit that the donor is bound to honour the pledge. Prior to this it 
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is merely considered an expression of intent to provide a voluntary contribution of assets, 
lacking compulsion, unless otherwise agreed.
43
  
As a consequence, it is evident that the adoption of treaties between the trustee and 
State/intergovernmental organisation donors is not a general requirement in the international 
law of trusts, although it is good practice where the trustee is able to enforce them through the 
adoption of binding instruments. Where the trustee is a UN specialised agency or a UN 
Programme, such as the UN Environmental Program (UNEP), which alone manages a 
sizeable amount of international trust funds, none of the surveyed Terms of Reference require 
UNEP to conclude donations in the form of treaties.
44
 As a result, UNEP’s agreements with 
donors can take many legal forms, ranging from treaties to MoU,
45
 even where donations are 
granted in respect of similar projects and sums.
46
 The same is true with regard to donor 
agreements accepted by the UNDP. The UNDP’s Financial Regulations and Rules require the 
conclusion of an agreement but fail to specify its legal nature.
47
 It is thus possible for donor 
agreements consummated with the UNDP to possess a non-binding character under the UN 
rationale analysed above. In practice, however, the UNDP has set up a model trust 
administration agreement which it now employs in its relationships with all its donors. It 
should not be thought that the adoption of a MoU instead of a treaty is more beneficial to the 
contributing State. On the contrary, it would seem that a binding treaty is a secure basis for 
confirming the rights and duties of the parties, given that it is in the interests of the trustee 
and the fund itself to bind the contributors to the amount of their pledge. The likely benefits 
of an MoU are perhaps its speedy conclusion and adoption, particularly where the donation is 
below a particular threshold, its confidentiality, as well as the avoidance of a perpetual 
obligation.
48
 
 Yet another reason for the avoidance of otherwise binding instruments, particularly in 
the UN system, concerns the desire to attract private donors. However, given that contracts 
must be “substantially the same” so as to ensure equality of treatment of the contracting 
entities, the governing law will be different in the trustee’s agreements with the private 
donors; this is most likely to be the law of the seat of the trustee, but where the contract is to 
be performed in a third territory the applicable law may well be the law of that country. This 
                                                 
43
 See J E Archibald, Pledges of Voluntary Contributions to the United Nations by Member States: Establishing 
and Enforcing Legal Obligations, (2004) 36 Geo Wash Int’l LR 317, pp 317-18, 329. Archibald rightly 
comments that with regard to unpaid voluntary contributions the UN does not invoke Art 19 of the UN Charter, 
pp 325-26. 
44
 COP Decision VCI/9 (28 April 1989) [Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer], available at: 
<http://ozone.unep.org/Publications/VC_Handbook/Section_2_Decisions/Article_6/Decs-
financial_matters/Decision_VCI-9.shtml#Annex%20III>. 
45
 Even though the general intention of the parties in concluding a MoU is the avoidance of entering into a 
binding instrument, we are in agreement with the position that the normative character of a MoU is judged both 
by its content and the intention of the parties. The two may sometimes be conflicting, but certainly one should 
not disregard the wish of the parties not to be bound by the terms of an agreement. A Aust, Modern Treaty Law 
and Practice (Cambridge UP, 2003), pp 26-34, 41-46. 
46
 MoU between Swedish Ministry of Sustainable Development and UNEP (Feb 2005); see also UN-HABITAT 
MoU with Canada for Contributing to the Water and Sanitation Trust Fund.  
47
 UNDP Financial Regulations and Rules (April 2000), Reg 5.07(a). Rule 108.1 states that trust funds shall be 
established either on the basis of a written agreement, or by the issuance of its terms of reference, in anticipation 
of receipt of contributions by prospective contributors. 
48
 See A Aust, The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments, (1986) 35 ICLQ 787. Lipson has 
added to this list the desire to avoid formal and visible pledges, the desire to avoid ratification, the ability to 
renegotiate or modify as circumstances change, as well as the need to reach agreements quickly. C Lipson, Why 
are Some International Agreements Informal? (1991) 45 Intl Org 495, p 500. Moreover, Bilder has argued that 
States may choose the option of non-binding accords out of a desire to manage more efficiently the risks of 
international agreement. See R B Bilder, Managing the Risks of International Agreement (Madison, 1981), pp 
24ff. 
equally entails the existence of an asymmetric relationship in which the trustee’s liabilities 
are limited by reason of his privileges, whereas the private party will bear the full range of 
personal liabilities without restriction.
49
 In reality, this is not such a pressing issue because 
international organisations incur full liability where they violate the terms of their contracts 
with private actors. The adoption of non-binding private instruments should not be excluded 
where the institutional rules of the trustee either allow, or omit reference to, such informal 
arrangements. The World Bank’s policies generally exclude the possibility of such 
agreements, whereas the UN specialised agencies that administer trust funds have taken a 
varied approach to the legal modalities of private contributions.
50
 The legal nature of the 
agreement will also depend on the type of contribution made. It is common for private 
contributors, particularly those in a specific industry, to donate in-kind, rather than cash.
51
 
 In some cases the entity of the trust and the parties’ pledges thereto may be 
constituted through a single agreement. Given that private entities may partake in the 
operations of such a trust fund, it becomes imperative to ascertain whether this single trust 
agreement is a treaty, a combination of treaty and domestic contract provisions, or whether it 
is in fact a domestic contract applicable equally among all parties. It should be noted from the 
outset that the prevalent view is that international organisations may theoretically be set up 
even by domestic contract, so long as their overall function is of a purely 
governmental/public nature.
52
 By analogy, the same is true in respect of intergovernmental 
trust funds. A detailed analysis of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this article. 
However, it suffices to say that there does not seem to exist any legal impediment to the 
creation of a two-tier agreement, parts of which operate as treaty provisions among member 
States, while others assume a contractual nature between States, the trustee and private actors. 
 Many donors, for whatever reasons, do not wish to partake in the organisational, 
fundraising, or other structure of the trust and are simply content to deposit, through a bank 
transfer, money into the account of the trust. Prima facie, it would seem that the deposit or 
transfer of a donation into a bank account held by the trustee is a unilateral act that is devoid 
of legal compulsion because it does not establish any further legal obligations and 
corresponding rights for the trust fund or the trustee, particularly where it is not preceded by a 
contractual agreement by which the State has undertaken to make the contribution. This 
assumption is untrue for a number of reasons. For one thing, the act of deposit serves to 
implement the pledge, irrespective of whether this was originally considered as giving rise to 
legitimate expectations or not. Secondly, upon deposit into the account of the trust, that 
entity’s terms of reference come into operation and may render, where applicable, its assets 
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immune from suits and further oblige the trustee to invest and disburse the trust’s assets, 
among others.
53
 If the deposit, therefore, was merely a unilateral act that was devoid of any 
legal effects, the contributing State could at any time claim the reimbursement of the money 
contributed on the basis that by its action of deposit it had not created any legitimate 
expectations vis-à-vis the trust fund or the trustee. Thirdly, the deposit of the contribution by 
the donor State must necessarily be met with a corresponding acceptance by the private bank 
where the trust’s account is held and also by the trustee. In some cases this acceptance may 
be tacit, but even so it will no doubt be recorded somewhere, whether in the private bank’s 
records of deposit or the trustee’s official audits. Normally, as is consistent with audit 
practices, the trustee is required under his internal rules and regulations to approve the 
contribution and make a clear record of it.
54
 That this constitutes a clear correspondence of 
the wills of the respective parties is confirmed by the fact that the trustee may refuse to accept 
the donation where the contribution has been earmarked by the donor to the dissatisfaction of 
the trustee,
55
 or where it is deemed inconsistent with the terms of the trust fund. 
Moreover, the trust agreement is hierarchically superior, at least in the UN system, 
over the financial rules and regulations of the UN’s specialised agencies, in the sense that it 
may provide authority to the trustee (where the trustee is not the United Nations or a 
subdivision thereof) to audit the financial management of the specialised agency where the 
latter is acting as an implementing or other entity.
56
  
 
 
Applicable Law 
 
References to applicable law are made throughout this article depending on the subject matter 
under discussion. It is useful, nonetheless, to consolidate this  issue under a single section for 
purposes of clarity. Where a trust fund possesses sufficient international legal personality to 
interact with States under its own name it will do so via treaties or MoU, both of which are 
governed by international law. The relationship between a trust that has been granted limited 
international legal personality by a Headquarters Agreement and the granting State will be 
determined on the basis of that Agreement, which usually stipulates for the applicability of a 
substantial corpus of domestic law, in addition to some international law.
57
 Equally, in their 
transactions with private parties, intergovernmental trusts, irrespective of their legal 
organisation, will typically stipulate a particular domestic law as the applicable law to their 
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contracts. This does not, however, exclude the application altogether of international law 
whether implicitly or by reason of the contract itself, if the parties so wish. 
In the majority of cases the trust entity will have conferred its contractual powers to 
the trustee, which will typically be an international development bank or some other 
international organisation, such as the UN. As a result, the contractual practices of these 
organisations become relevant in any attempts to discern the applicable law. By way of 
illustration, the IBRD and IDA subject their loan and credit arrangements with State entities
58
 
to public international law,
59
 subject to very minor and specific exceptions in respect of 
necessarily local matters such as the creation of sureties. On the other hand, the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) subjects its arrangements with States to a given national law.
60
  
Where the entire gamut of the contractual transactions of a trust fund are performed 
by its trustee, the applicable law and terms of said contracts are most commonly predicated 
on the trustee’s institutional requirements and internal by-laws. The United Nations, for 
example, in its contractual relations with private entities (e.g. contractors) appends thereto as 
an integral part its General Conditions of Contract, with particular variations in respect of 
contracts for construction,
61
 the provision of goods,
62
 consultancies and others. This 
instrument is rather favourable for the UN. The applicable law in respect of individual 
contracts is a matter for negotiation between the parties and as a result it is not stipulated in 
the General Conditions, which do, however, oblige the parties to settle their disputes through 
an arbitral mechanism, should other amicable means fail.
63
 The practice of the IBRD is 
somewhat different and section 1.01 of the 2006 General Conditions for Loans stresses that 
“if any provision of any legal agreement is inconsistent with a provision of these General 
Conditions, the provisions of the legal agreement shall govern”. This affirms that in the 
IBRD’s legal relationships with third parties there are situations whereby its institutional law 
is by no means imperative, whereas in respect to others the Bank’s institutional law is a sine 
qua non requirement of the transaction. The latter is true, at least, with regard to the Bank’s 
consent in setting up and administering trust funds.  
The UN Legal Counsel has made it clear that the Organisation can incur liabilities of 
a private nature, particularly where they arise from transactions arising from contracts, 
purchase orders, leases and other agreements.
64
 Equally, therefore, the choice of forum and 
lex arbitri is a matter to be settled by agreement between the parties.
65
 The governing law of 
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 It may also be determined by the courts in some cases. For example, the recent practice of English courts is to 
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private contracts entered into between international organisations and private entities is 
usually designated by reference to the law of the seat of the international organisation, 
particularly where the private party’s operations lie therein. Conversely, where the 
performance of the contract is to be undertaken in a territory other than the seat of the 
organisation, especially where these are of a small scale not involving significant resources, 
said contracts will be governed by the national law of the country where the service is 
provided. Loan agreements with private entities entered into by the IBRD and the IMF are 
governed either by the law of the place of the loan or by the law on whose territory the 
private contracting banks are incorporated, or by the law of the State of New York.
66
 In every 
case, the relevance of international law should not be underestimated, even in contracts 
between the trustee and private entities, as well as in those cases where the parties have not 
even designated international law as their choice of law.
67
 
 
 
 
The Donor Agreement does not Necessarily Establish the Trust Entity 
 
The trust agreement between the appointee (or donor) and the trustee may, but does not 
necessarily or ipso facto establish the entity of the trust fund. For certain, it acts as an 
instrument of appointment, followed by a further obligation by the trustee to set up the trust 
fund by means of an internal institutional act, usually by opening a bank account and 
thereafter arranging the modalities for deposits, financial maintenance and disbursement. This 
is the standard practice of the World Bank Group, the leading trustee of humanitarian projects 
financed by States.
68
 One should therefore distinguish between the requirement of agreement 
between the donor and the trustee in order for the donor to contribute assets and/or participate 
in the institutional workings of the trust fund (what we may term as the process of 
trusteeship), from the very fact of setting up a trust fund in the first place (the creation of the 
trust entity). One may call this the “separability dimension” of intergovernmental trust funds, 
which works much in the same way as the doctrine of separability in the law of arbitration. 
An intergovernmental trust fund may be set up without any existing donors, in the 
expectation of prospective donors. This qualified fund may be achieved by means of an intra-
institutional act of an intergovernmental organisation. On the contrary, no State may be 
forced to contribute to a trust fund, as this would lack the element of consent and would no 
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doubt contravene the most fundamental premise of the law of international trust funds. It is 
for this reason that the UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Establishment and 
Management of Trust Funds distinguishes between trust funds (which are based wholly on 
voluntary contributions) from special accounts (which are funded in whole or in part from 
assessed contributions).
69
 The Bulletin expressly highlights the fact that although the UN 
Secretariat and the General Assembly may set up trust funds as a matter of institutional law, 
the participation of donors therein requires some form of agreement.
70
 
Certain trusts, particularly those that do not envisage the appointment of an external 
trustee and which are premised solely on treaties between States, incorporate within the body 
of the treaty both the agreement between the participants as well as the normative 
establishment of the trust. In this manner, the trust is deemed as existing from the moment of 
ratification of the treaty. This two-in-one type of agreement is rare and generally concerns 
those trusts composed of a limited and closed number of States. The Tuvalu Trust Fund is of 
this nature, having been set up by a multilateral treaty between the UK, Australia, New 
Zealand and Tuvalu, with the aim of contributing to the long-term financial viability of 
Tuvalu by providing an additional source of revenue in respect of the government’s recurrent 
expenses that would ultimately lead to financial autonomy.
71
 This model is quite prevalent in 
respect of all those trust entities derived from multilateral treaties that are also designated by 
their drafters as constituting international organisations. The Tuvalu Trust is itself an 
international organisation, as is also the Global Crop Diversity Trust and the Common Fund 
for Commodities. 
Exceptionally, those multilateral treaties that envisage the creation of trusts for the 
purpose of victim compensation generally require the promulgation of an additional 
normative act, usually a decree approved by parliament, which dresses the trust with 
domestic legal personality. This is the case with the Foundation Remembrance, 
Responsibility and the Future Fund (Remembrance Fund), set up on the basis of a multilateral 
agreement
72
 and in respect of which the Fund is an entity under German public law.
73
 The 
same considerations as those outlined above in relation to the Remembrance Fund are also 
true with respect to the Austrian General Settlement Fund (GSF) that was established on the 
basis of the 2001 Washington Agreement between Austria and the USA with the purpose of 
compensating victims of the Austrian Nazi-era regime.
74
 
The practice of States in the formation of intergovernmental trusts clearly stipulates 
that there exist no limitations as to the legal organisation of the entity of the trust. Thus, we 
have already made reference to trusts incorporated as full international organisations, which 
is certainly not the rule. Trusts are otherwise organised as mere bank accounts without a trace 
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of independent personality other than that of the trustee; as limited international organisations 
on the basis of a Headquarters agreement that only has bilateral effect and by which trusts are 
generally registered as special domestic law foundations; as subsidiary organs of international 
organisations; as informal conferences without any international legal personality.
75
 In 
respect of those trusts that do not possess any domestic or international legal personality, all 
transactions on their behalf are undertaken through the person of the trustee but under their 
name. This is done in order to distinguish the trust’s assets from those of the trustee. In every 
other respect, the very fact of the trust relationship whereby the trust’s assets are held in 
ownership by the trustee serves to protect them in the same way as the trustee’s own assets. 
Nonetheless, in practice, it is not unusual for trusts lacking legal personality to contract 
directly with other persons, legal or physical, as a matter of necessity. However, because this 
situation may potentially create problems for those trusts that are devoid of legal personality, 
their creators are increasingly formally endowing them with the requisite amount of 
personality that will enable them to carry out their day-to-day affairs.
76
  
 
 
 
Justifications for Creating the Entity of the Trust on the basis of the Institutional Law 
of the UN and the World Bank 
 
We have already determined that whereas the agreement between the donors and the trustee 
sets in motion the pooling of the required financial resources, the actual creation of the trust 
vehicle generally rests on an additional act of the trustee. It is not self-evident that 
international organisations can readily assume the role of trustee, nor that they have the 
power to give birth to trust funds on the basis of their institutional and implied powers. Even 
if the organisation under consideration was found to be competent to act as trustee and set up 
trust entities, it does not follow that all the organs within the organisation possess that 
capacity also. The following sections attempt to shed some light on this issue. 
 
 
The IMF Special Facilities as Trust Paradigms 
 
Trust funds established by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) share many of the 
characteristics of other intergovernmental trust funds, but are unique in the sense that the IMF 
is both creator (in the sense that there exists no external mandate by a pool of prospective 
donors), trustee and partial contributor to the financial resources of its trusts,
77
 although this 
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 This is possible in accordance with Art V(2)(b) of the IMF’s 1945 Articles of Agreement, 2 U.N.T.S 39. 
However, this provision does not explicitly stipulate the ability to establish trust funds, but this possibility is 
inferred from the competence to “perform financial and technical services … that are consistent with the 
practice is also common within the UN system. It will become evident in this section that the 
IMF’s special trust funds entail diverse legal relationships between the trustee and the 
borrowers and between the trustee and the trust’s creditors. In any event, it is obvious why 
the IMF would choose to perform the functions of trustee to trust funds it has itself 
established; it has the experience, know-how and technical mechanisms (e.g. access to 
financial resources, assets and links with member State contributors that are willing to 
provide assets in respect of particular funding mechanisms) to carry out such tasks. Another 
practical consideration is that the trust funds created by the IMF are created for the benefit of, 
and tied to, programmes tackling debt-relief, poverty alleviation and balance of payments in 
the developing world, which are themselves created and managed by the IMF and which fall 
within its ambit of programmatic objectives. 
The principal legal basis for establishing an IMF or IBRD trust fund is their respective 
Articles of Agreement, albeit there are no provisions therein that pertain to the establishment 
of trusts. The Articles, however, stipulate that the World Bank entities must use their 
resources and facilities for the benefit of their members
78
 and the employment of trusts is 
certainly a mechanism designed to give effect to this mandate. On the basis of this 
undertaking the IBRD adopted its operational policies and procedures in respect of 
establishing and managing trusts.
79
 This legal basis has allowed the IMF to adopt so-called 
Instruments and set up trust funds as principal accounts and sub-accounts thereof. Unlike 
other trust funds examined in this article, IMF trust funds established as accounts and sub-
accounts do not possess and do not aspire to possess any form of international legal 
personality outside the legal person of the IMF. Indeed, there is no practical reason why this 
should occur, since the functions, assets and personnel of the account/trust fund are protected 
by the privileges and immunities of the IMF under its Articles of Agreement.
80
 Another 
practical implication is that the external contributors “contract” with the IMF and not the 
account.  Moreover, it is evident that the lack of a delegated complex trustee structure makes 
the whole enterprise far more cost-effective. A typical example is the Instrument for a 
Framework Administered Account for Technical Assistance Activities [Framework 
Account].
81
 That the Framework Account is a trust is evident from section 1 of the 
Instrument, which states as its purpose; 
 
… the administration of resources to be contributed by: (i) governments or other official agencies of countries 
and (ii) inter-governmental organisations … in order to finance technical activities of the [IMF].  
 
Given that the contributors to the trust fund possess international legal personality, the 
Instrument of which omits all references to private entities, these must necessarily enter into 
specific donor agreements with the IMF. In accordance with section 2 of the Instrument the 
resources provided by the donors shall be either: a) grants, or; b) proceeds of grants or loans 
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that have been received by the donor from entities other than the IMF, i.e. from private or 
public banks, or similar financial institutions. The transfer of the latter type to the IMF may, 
in fact, require multiple transactions because the proceeds of such a grant may be in the 
possession or account of a private financial institution, or somehow be owed to the donor 
State/intergovernmental organisation by a third party. Equally, since the relevant instruments 
permit donors to contribute loans they have taken out for the purposes of the particular trust 
fund, it may very well be decided that the private (or public, or central) bank providing the 
loan must transfer the money/ financial assets to the IMF through a single or multiple 
transactions. The elaboration of such transactions are beyond the scope of this article, but it 
suffices to say that where the grant or its proceeds are transferred to the account of the IMF 
by a private bank, even where it is acting on behalf of the State/international organisation, 
such payments through bank transfers are subject to private banking law unless otherwise 
stipulated.
82
 The same is obviously not true with the agreement/commitment to contribute to 
the trust fund, which is assumed as a legal obligation by the State/international organisation 
vis-à-vis the IMF and which is governed by international law and is, moreover, subject to the 
law of treaties. However, such agreements for additional funding between donors and the 
IMF are not necessary and donor States can equally proceed on the basis of unilateral 
declarations or by making an oral pledge to the trust fund and thereafter entering into an 
agreement with the recipient/borrower with the aim of cancelling a pre-existing debt of the 
borrower. 
The instruments that establish the trusts have received little analysis as to their legal 
nature. With respect to the relationship between the IMF as trustee and the donors, is it 
prudent and feasible to view it as operating under the guise of primary or “secondary 
treaties”? As a primary treaty the instrument would be the only source of obligation for the 
parties, while as a “secondary treaty”, although not subject to signature or ratification, the 
instrument would nonetheless constitute a valid legal basis of obligation because explicit 
reference would be made to it in the bilateral donor agreements, in which case the bilateral 
donor agreement would constitute the basis of mutual obligation. The reality of course is that 
since the instruments are adopted as decisions by the executive board of the IMF they do not 
possess the normative traits of treaties, but serve as IMF institutional law. Nonetheless, the 
bilateral donor agreements, where indeed they are found to exist, if at all, must necessarily 
conform to the provisions of the Instruments and as such the instruments necessarily operate 
as “secondary treaties”, since the trust fund instrument is intended by the parties to govern 
their legal relationships. This hypothesis does not mean that the instruments are treaties by 
nature, but where a bilateral agreement exists between the trustee and the donor these either 
become an integral part of the bilateral agreements or alternatively the donor agreements 
must be interpreted in full conformity with the trust instruments. Either way, the same result 
is achieved. 
Subsequent IMF trust funds expressly noted that the relevant instruments are indeed 
intended to establish a trust fund and that the IMF was to act as trustee. Equally, as already 
pointed out, the IMF utilised trust funds in order to finance ongoing efforts to tackle poverty, 
underdevelopment and Third World debt by setting up a variety of trust vehicles and by 
combining its various initiatives therein. Examples include the Heavily Indebted Poor 
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Countries (HIPC) Initiative, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and the 
Exogenous Shocks Facility, all of which are inter-related. The IMF commenced a practice as 
early as 1976 of providing concessional financing to low-income countries through the 
establishment of a trust fund which loaned the profits generated from the sale of part of the 
IMF’s holdings. The relative success of this trust vehicle was later followed by the 
establishment of a Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) whose aim was to recycle resources 
loaned under the trust fund itself. A year later an Enhanced SAF came into being with the 
additional aim of putting in place stronger adjustment and reform measures.
83
 In 1991 its 
name was changed even further and it became known as the Enhanced SAF to the Poverty 
Reduction Growth Facility and was later replaced by the Poverty Reduction Growth 
Facility.
84
 The setting up of accounts (otherwise described as facilities) to achieve the 
purposes of trust funds were thus employed through the following instruments, among others: 
the Instrument to establish a Trust for Special PRGF Operations for the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries and Interim PRGF Subsidy Operations (Special PRGF Trust);
85
 the 
Instrument to establish the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and Exogenous Shocks 
Facility Trust (PRGF-ESF Trust);
86
 the Instrument to establish the Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative-I (MDRI-I Trust).
87
 Unlike the vast majority of intergovernmental trust funds that 
generally finance identified activities in the form of non-reimbursable donations, the IMF’s 
trust funds disburse assets to beneficiaries in the form of highly preferential loans. PRGF 
loans are disbursed under three-year arrangements, subject to observance of performance 
criteria and the completion of program reviews. Loans carry an annual interest rate of 0.5 
percent, with a 5-1/2 year grace period and a 10-year maturity. 
As far as the relationship between the IMF as trustee and the borrowers is concerned, 
this is not wholly clear from the terms of the relevant instruments. Certainly the IMF does not 
expressly subject these to the regime of stand-by-arrangements under Article XXX(b) of its 
Articles of Agreement, nor is it possible to assimilate them to extended arrangements because 
the financial resources loaned to the borrower are not derived from the IMF’s General 
Resources Account, as is otherwise required in respect of extended arrangements. In order to 
decipher the precise legal nature of this relationship one has to assess the practice of the 
Fund. Thus, eligibility for a loan under the PRGF requires the submission of a so-called 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) by the borrower, in consultation with civil society, 
in which the borrower must sufficiently elaborate and explain his financial situation, the steps 
taken to improve it and in what ways the loan under the terms of the PRGF would be utilised, 
as well as elaborate on the expected outcome. This is a typical example of assigning full local 
ownership to the requesting State through the adoption of PRSP that are country-owned and 
therefore country-specific in orientation. These PRSP are in fact no different from the Letters 
of Intent required for stand-by-arrangements which the IMF has consistently described as 
being non-contractual in nature. In practice, PRGF and HIPC borrowers submit such reports 
to the IMF under both designations as either PRSP or letters of intent, in anticipation of a 
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PRGF or HIPC loan.
88
 More specifically, in order to be considered for HIPC Initiative 
assistance, a country must: (1) be IDA-only and PRGF-eligible; (2) face an unsustainable 
debt burden that is beyond traditionally available debt-relief mechanisms; (3) establish a track 
record of reform and sound policies through IMF and IDA-supported programs; and (4) have 
developed a PRSP on the basis of broad public consultation. Once a country has met or made 
sufficient progress in meeting these criteria the Executive Boards of the IMF and IDA 
formally decide on its eligibility for debt relief and the international community subsequently 
commits itself to reducing debt to the agreed sustainability threshold. Where this is achieved, 
a country reaches its so-called “decision point” and may thereafter immediately begin 
receiving interim relief on its debt. In order to receive the full and irrevocable reduction in 
debt available under the HIPC Initiative, however, the country must: (i) establish a further 
track record of good performance under IMF- and IDA-supported programs; (ii) implement 
satisfactorily key reforms agreed at the decision point, and (iii) adopt and implement the 
PRSP for at least one year. Once a country has met these criteria it can thereafter reach its 
completion point, at which time lenders are expected to provide the full debt relief committed 
at the decision point.
89
 There is a clear intention, therefore, on the part of the IMF to avoid 
contractualisation of this relationship under the same terms as its stand-by-arrangements on 
the basis of its Board’s executive decision. This is certainly the personal understanding of this 
author. This non-contractual nature is further reinforced by the practice of some borrowers to 
append a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to their PRSP, which is intended to serve the 
same function as reservations and interpretative declarations to multilateral treaties, although 
as we have already stressed that the IMF’s decisions to grant loans are not considered treaties, 
but are treated as internal decisions that lack a contractual character. It is the very fact that the 
borrower chooses to employ the services of an MoU to explain his implementation of the 
imposed conditionalities that the non-contractual character of these arrangements vis-à-vis 
the borrower can be confirmed. 
Unlike the compulsory contributions to the IMF’s General Account by its members on 
the basis of their obligations under the Fund’s Articles of Agreement, contributions to the 
Fund’s special trusts is not restricted to Fund members, States or intergovernmental 
organisations.
90
 The relevant provisions are almost identical and by way of example, section 
II of the Special PRGF Trust Instrument notes that: 
 
The trustee may accept contributions of resources for the Account on such terms and conditions as may be 
agreed between the trustee and the respective contributors, subject to the provisions of this Instrument. For this 
purpose, the Managing Director of the trustee is authorised to accept grants and enter into loan, deposit or other 
types of investment agreements with the contributors to the Trust. 
 
The texts of the instruments pose no visible limitations to contributors. In practice, given that 
neither the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) nor the New Arrangements to Borrow 
(NAB), through which the IMF receives financial contributions that are additional to its 
members’ Special Drawing Rights (SDR), involve private entities it is wholly implausible to 
assume that an exception is possible in respect of the IMF’s trust funds. This assumed 
limitation would not exclude central banks and public banks. On the other hand, there is no 
visible reason under the terms of the trusts’ instruments to assume the exclusion of private 
contributions and there does not seem to be any legal impediment to this effect either. The 
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only possible limitation that may be read in the texts is the commitment by the IMF to use 
contributions in respect of the stated purposes of the relevant trust fund, which is also a 
requirement in relevant IBRD trust funds.
91
 Other than that, private persons face no 
institutional impediment in contributing resources to the IMF’s special accounts. 
Practice confirms this conclusion. In fact, the PRGF and the MDRI, as do all the 
IMF’s special trust vehicles, rely on the additional contributions of member States,92 as well 
as on those of private entities, particularly in the area of debt relief.
93
 Under the HIPC and 
MDRI, contributions are not only received by the positive act of depositing financial assets, 
but more importantly by agreeing to extinguish pre-existing debts owed to them by HIPC and 
MDRI-eligible States. Debt relief under these IMF initiatives has been supplied in one of two 
ways: a) by the Paris Club, which is an informal group of nineteen sovereign creditors among 
the globe’s industrialised States that meets in Paris with the aim of offering debt relief and/or 
debt restructuring. Since the adoption of the PRGF the Paris Club has offered better debt 
restructuring to HIPC-eligible countries than non-HIPC countries. At the time of writing, and 
since the mid-1950s, the Paris Club has entered into more than four hundred debt relief 
agreements with debtor States.
94
 Participating creditor countries and the debtor country 
usually sign an Agreed Minute at the end of a negotiation session. This is not a legally 
binding document but merely a recommendation by the heads of delegations of participating 
creditor countries to their governments to sign a bilateral agreement implementing the debt 
treatment. When there are only a few creditors concerned the Paris Club agreement is 
exchanged through mail between the Chair of the Paris Club and the government of the 
debtor country, and is called terms of reference. In some cases the multilateral debt 
agreement takes the form of an MoU. Either way, one has to examine the particular language 
of the respective agreements in order to ascertain their binding or non-binding nature. As 
regards non Paris Club creditors, they typically enter into bilateral agreements with debtor 
States, either under the HIPC or independently of it. Numerous bilateral agreements have 
been concluded in this manner whether as treaties or MoU.
95
 It is, therefore, evident that the 
IMF’s special facilities/trust funds are not based in all their dimensions on the Fund’s 
institutional law, as is the case with its stand-by-arrangements. Rather, the Fund’s trustee 
relationship with its debtors is institutional, whereas its relationship with creditors – as well 
as that between creditors and the debtors in some cases – is contractual. 
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United Nations Special Accounts 
 
The UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Establishment and Management of Trust Funds 
states that the Organisation recognises two types of trust funds: general and technical 
cooperation trust funds.
96
 General trust funds are set up to support any activity other than 
technical cooperation. Thus, they may be used to “expand the work program of one or more 
organisational units of the Secretariat, or for humanitarian and relief purposes to provide 
direct assistance in respect of emergency situations”. They may be of a continuing or long-
term nature or simply for a specific duration.
97
 Technical cooperation trust funds, on the other 
hand, are such that provide economic and social development assistance to developing 
countries. This may include the provision of experts and associate experts by the donor State, 
the financing of training initiatives and the provision of project equipment.
98
 
The Bulletin differentiates between these two types of trust funds, which are the only 
entities defined as such, from all other special accounts whose funding is derived from extra-
budgetary resources. Thus, only the two types of trust funds (i.e. general and technical 
cooperation) are subject to the provisions of the Bulletin and not those voluntary funds that 
are subject to the administrative authority of their respective heads, such as UNICEF, UNDP, 
UNFPA, the funds of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and others.
99
 This is also true 
in respect of voluntary accounts set up to finance peacekeeping and related operations, which 
are not to be regulated as trust funds under the Bulletin, but solely in accordance with the 
UN’s Financial Regulations and Rules. The rationale for this differentiation lies in the fact 
that the majority of peacekeeping operations are generally financed from assessed, rather than 
voluntary, contributions.
100
 As a result, it is logical to subject them to a different legal regime, 
albeit two conclusions seem reasonable: a) peacekeeping missions that are funded through 
voluntary contributions may be regarded as trust funds for UN financing purposes,
101
 and; b) 
special accounts do in fact constitute trust funds in the general legal sense despite their 
financing from assessed contributions. Their distinction from other UN trust funds is only 
valid as such in respect of the UN’s institutional law. 
The various principal organs of the United Nations have set up so-called special 
accounts in order to either finance projects in respect of which additional funds were required 
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apart from the regular UN budget, or where such a special account was imposed by the 
Security Council. I shall restrict my analysis to trust funds established as special accounts by 
the General Assembly, the Secretary-General and the Security Council for both of the 
aforementioned scenaria. It will be demonstrated, as already mentioned, that these special 
accounts are in fact true trust funds. In the case of the Secretary-General and the General 
Assembly, although their authority to establish trust funds may stem from Security Council 
resolutions or as a direct result of their implied powers, it is also grounded in Regulation 4.13 
and Rule 104.3 of the UN’s Financial Regulations and Rules.102 That these entities are 
consistent with the general definition of intergovernmental trusts provided above is evident 
from the following: a) they are predicated on a tripartite contractual relationship in which 
neither the trustee nor the donors derive a personal benefit; b) the financial contributions held 
by the UN, as trustee, are held separately from other accounts and the UN regular budget; c) 
the UN’s liability in respect of each trust account is limited to the funds contained in that 
account alone. These trusts are distinguishable from the UN’s regular budget because the 
latter is not predicated on a tripartite relationship, but only on one that involves the UN and 
its members. Moreover, the regular budget cannot exist absent the legal person of the 
Organisation, which is not the case with trust funds because they do not require their 
incorporation into a legal person. Finally, although member States are not generally 
responsible for the acts undertaken by the Organisation, the latter cannot exclude its liability 
against third parties by means of unilateral declarations or by means of any implied 
understanding. 
 
 
 
Special Accounts and Trust Funds of the UN General Assembly 
 
During the Cold War, at which time the General Assembly undertook the role of organising 
peacekeeping, peace monitoring and peace enforcement operations around the globe, it 
necessarily also undertook the task of fundraising for the costs associated with these 
operations. As contributions to such missions could not be sought from the UN’s regular 
budget alone,
103
 extraordinary contributions were solicited by the General Assembly by 
ordering member States to pay weighed assessments, whereby permanent Security Council 
members and economically developed States would share the bulk of the expenses, while 
developing States would pay a far smaller contribution. Resolution 43/231, for example, 
requested the Secretary-General to establish a special account in order to finance the UN 
Angola Verification Mission.
104
 States were ordered to pay assessed contributions on the 
basis of the scale analysed.  
It is significant that despite the omission in naming a trustee in the relevant resolution, 
the text necessarily suggests that this is the Secretary-General through the UN Secretariat. 
Under the terms of the Angola Verification Mission, for example, the Secretary-General is 
not only responsible for setting up the special account (operative paragraph 1), but is 
moreover  
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… requested to take all necessary action to ensure that the [Mission] is administered with the maximum of 
efficiency and economy bearing in mind the relevant observations contained in the report of the Advisory 
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.
105
 
 
Hence, unlike the IMF trust accounts, in respect of which the IMF was both creator and 
trustee, the General Assembly’s special accounts are set up by the Assembly but administered 
by the Secretary-General in his natural capacity as chief administrator of the Organisation. 
The trustee’s duties and mandate are set out in the resolution itself and by its very nature each 
special account is distinct from the funds of the UN’s general budget or other specialised 
accounts or trust funds. The resolutions further allow for additional funds to be donated, in 
which case a fiscal transaction would be required between the Secretary-General and the 
donating State, since special accounts do not possess independent legal personality, although 
naturally the trustee can contract with third parties under their name. 
These special accounts should be contrasted from other voluntary trust funds 
established by the General Assembly, particularly in the field of human rights. These are 
subjected to the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the establishment of trust funds as described 
above. The legal bases, structure and mandate of all such voluntary trust funds are identical. 
The three most prominent are the Voluntary Fund for Indigenous Populations,
106
 the 
Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture
107
 and the Voluntary Fund on Contemporary Forms of 
Slavery.
108
 For one thing the legal basis for each is a General Assembly resolution. Unlike the 
special accounts that concerned budgetary issues and more particularly contributions to the 
UN’s peace-keeping missions, for which the Assembly may adopt binding resolutions,109 the 
human rights trust funds under consideration involve only voluntary contributions and 
therefore do not fall within the Assembly’s authority to pass binding resolutions. Secondly, 
although the UN Secretary-General is mandated to serve as their administrator, there is also 
provision for an independent board of trustees to effectively manage and provide fiduciary 
duties. No such governance or trustee structure exists with regard to the Assembly’s special 
accounts. Therein the boards of trustees, although independent, maintain only a supervisory 
capacity and do not possess any decision-making authority over matters pertinent to 
disbursement. Thirdly, on the basis of their mandate, it is unarguable that the Assembly’s 
voluntary trust funds do indeed possess a significant degree of international legal personality, 
as distinct from their creator, and as such qualify the characterisation of subsidiary organs of 
the Assembly.
110
 In practice, the Assembly may “appropriate” trust funds originally set up by 
the Secretary-General in the form of subsidiary organs under its authority, as was the case 
with the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA). This trust fund was originally 
established by the Secretariat in 1969 but was subsequently incorporated under the authority 
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of the Assembly in 1972.
111
 In construing this incorporation from an institutional perspective, 
the Office of the UN Legal Counsel noted that Article 22 of the UN Charter certainly 
authorises the Assembly to establish subsidiary organs, presumably even in the 
aforementioned manner involving subsequent adoption by one principal organ to the 
detriment of another.
112
 Finally, both types of trust funds are capable of receiving private 
donations although in the case of the voluntary trust funds this is likely to be a major source 
of income. Equally, both types are administered in accordance with the Financial Regulations 
and Rules of the UN.
113
 
 
 
 
Special Accounts and Trust Funds of the UN Security Council 
 
This section deals with trust funds established by the Security Council and one should, 
therefore, distinguish situations in which the Council directly sets up a trust fund from those 
where it simply welcomes the establishment of a particular trust, even if the entity setting it 
up has itself been created by the Council, as would be the case with a Security Council 
subsidiary organ.
114
 These trust funds and special accounts are not subject to the Secretary-
General’s Bulletin on trust funds, because that instrument only regulates funds and special 
accounts set up by the General Assembly and the Secretariat.  
Following the Gulf War in 1990 the Security Council determined in paragraph 16 of 
Resolution 687 that Iraq was “liable under international law for any direct loss, damage … or 
injury to foreign governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait”.115 In accordance with paragraph 18 of the Resolution 
the Council decided to create a trust fund (Kuwait Compensation Fund) and an administering 
Compensation Commission that would put the modalities in place to assess relevant 
compensation claims, which would exist alongside a trust vehicle from which Iraqi assets 
would be channelled to compensate injured parties. The Compensation Fund was to be 
replenished by financial assets derived from the sale of petroleum by Iraq (export sales). The 
Secretary-General, who was entrusted with formulating an appropriate mechanism, proposed 
that the Fund be set up as a special account subject to the UN’s Financial Regulations and 
Rules.
116
 He further proposed that the Compensation Fund/Special Account be administered 
by the Compensation Commission, and in particular the Commission’s Governing Council as 
this was envisaged in Resolution 687 in the form of a Security Council subsidiary organ.
117
 
The Report put forward three alternatives as to the Fund’s practical existence, whereby 
surprisingly only one alternative was not endowed with some share of international legal 
personality; this was a simple escrow account. The other two alternatives envisaged: a) the 
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Fund as the sole or co-beneficiary on the bill of lading or other title and any letter of credit 
issued, following which the Fund would retain its share and remit the remainder to Iraq; b) an 
escrow account endowed with privileges and immunities and designated beneficiary to the 
bills of lading, etc, administered by a central bank or appropriate international institution.
118
 
Unlike the General Assembly’s special accounts, the Secretary-General seems to have been 
conscious that exigencies may have required the Fund Account to not only contract and hold 
assets in its name, but also to operate as an equal partner across various jurisdictions, as well 
as with intergovernmental organisations apart from the legal personality of its trustee. We are 
not suggesting that the Secretary-General envisaged a quasi-intergovernmental organisation, 
although it is beyond doubt that he certainly suggested endowing it with some degree of legal 
personality that is absent from other UN special accounts. 
Eventually, the Compensation Fund and the Commission were created by the 
Council
119
 and although the escrow account-type was preferred no definitive legal personality 
was attached to these accounts. However, given that the Council adopted subsequent 
resolutions whereby it set up additional escrow accounts, which were administered by the 
Secretary-General and were further endowed with particular privileges and immunities, it 
seems fair to argue that in fact the Kuwait Compensation Fund does possess a degree of 
international legal personality.
120
 The escrow accounts/funds established by Council 
resolutions 706 and 712 were new interim trust funds and the two resolutions authorised the 
import by UN member States of Iraqi petroleum products for a six month period, up to the 
amount of US$1,6 billion, in order to finance all the operations mandated under Resolution 
687. Such proceeds were to be deposited in the two escrow accounts and from there 
transferred to the Compensation Fund,
121
 among others. However, when Iraq failed to satisfy 
the compensatory terms of all previous resolutions and in order for the Compensation 
Commission to carry out its work it was decided that an amount be advanced from the UN 
Working Capital Fund. The situation had not been remedied by 1995 when the Council 
adopted Resolution 986 by which thirty percent of Iraqi oil sales would be allocated to the 
Compensation Fund.
122
 The mechanism envisaged in Resolution 986 was the so-called “Oil-
for-Food” programme and although it took almost twenty months to bring it into effect the 
money deposited in the Compensation Fund enabled it to function effectively.
123
 Proceeds 
from the oil-for-food programme were themselves to be deposited in two separate 
accounts/funds.
124
 Following the deposition of the Hussein regime in the aftermath of the 
2003 Iraq war the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to terminate the oil-for-
food programme and amend to five percent the percentage of export sales of all Iraqi 
petroleum products deposited in the Compensation Fund.
125
 
No doubt, the historical analysis of the Compensation Fund depicts a complex web of 
legal relationships. The Compensation Fund is composed of two distinct entities; the Trust 
Fund in the form of a special escrow account and the Compensation Commission, consisting 
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of a Governing Council and a Secretariat. In its capacity as a subsidiary organ of the Security 
Council it enjoys the immunities and privileges of the United Nations. The Trust Fund itself 
is a distinct legal entity from the Commission and as a result the latter cannot automatically 
confer by way of right its own legal personality to the Fund. The Trust Fund is certainly 
subject to the Commission’s authority as its appointed trustee. The various escrow accounts 
(essentially special accounts/trust funds) established by the Security Council since 1991, a 
significant purpose of which was to funnel money into the Compensation Fund, maintained a 
particular legal relationship with the Fund. On the one hand they were wholly independent 
legal entities, while on the other hand they were administered by different trustees; namely 
the Secretary-General in the case of the escrow accounts set up by Resolutions 706, 712 and 
986. Nonetheless, the following question necessarily arises: since all accounts/trust funds 
were created by the same entity, namely the Security Council, is the transfer of assets from 
the escrow Funds to the Compensation Fund a self-contract (or self-dealing), or a transaction 
between two distinct legal entities? The Council may have not paid any attention to this issue 
and certainly the establishment of separate accounts on the basis of each resolution may 
signify the rejection of self-dealing a priori. It should be pointed out that the non-existence of 
a self-contract is not premised on the multiplicity of accounts, but on the ownership of the 
particular accounts. In the present case the Compensation Fund and the other Council-based 
escrow accounts were created by the Council and the assets deposited therein are, until their 
final disbursement, in the ownership of the Council. However, it is also true, on the basis of 
our discussion, that the Council has endowed all the Funds with some degree of international 
legal personality and as a result they are capable of contracting in their own name and not 
solely through that of the Council.
126
 It is also fair to argue that the Council only delegated 
actual powers as opposed to mere functions. This is true because the Council did not simply 
delegate to the subsidiary body the authority to implement a particular decision, but conferred 
upon it authority to make decisions of its own right.
127
 It seems consistent with legal 
reasoning, therefore, to argue that all relevant transactions do not constitute self-contracts.
128
 
 Moreover, it is also briefly worth mentioning that in accordance with the Latin 
maxim delegatus non potest delegare, a delegate cannot delegate his authority to a third 
entity and this is also true with respect to the powers conferred to subsidiary organs of the 
Council.
129
 Even if this rule pertains to the institutional law of intergovernmental 
organisations generally, as well as the Security Council more particularly, it is subject to 
some exceptions. Such an exception must certainly pertain in respect of those trust 
instruments that authorise the trustee to carry out his functions through implementing agents, 
although in most cases these entities will be endowed with the ability to carry out functions 
rather than take substantive decisions. These exceptions to the non-delegation rule occur less 
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in the context of the United Nations, but are prevalent in respect of trust funds administered 
by the IBRD on account of the practice encountered in the relevant trust instruments. 
A less complicated Council-based trust fund is that established under the terms of 
Resolution 1177
130
 with the purpose of funding the work of and covering the expenses of the 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Delimitation and Demarcation of Border Commission (UN Border 
Commission Trust Fund). There is no mention in the reports of the Secretary-General and the 
Council as to whether the trust fund should be organised as a special account or under more 
elaborate terms,
131
 but the facts indicate that given the limited mandate and scope of this 
particular trust fund, the call to the Secretary-General to establish it must certainly fall within 
the ambit of Council-ordered special accounts. Clearly, depending on the financial size and 
scope of a projected trust fund, the Council may direct the Secretary-General to establish a 
fund with the attributes of the Compensation Fund, consisting of a trustee (in the form of a 
subsidiary body) and an elaborate governance system, or instead opt for a less complicated 
special account that is to be administered by the Secretary-General and subject to the UN’s 
Financial Regulations and Rules.
132
 
 
 
 
Special Accounts and Trust Funds of the UN Secretary-General 
 
There may well exist some degree of overlap between trust funds (as special accounts) 
established and operated by the Secretary-General in the exercise of his ordinary functions as 
administrator of the UN Organisation
133
 and those that are set up by the Secretary-General 
upon request by the General Assembly.
134
 Where the Secretary-General decides to set up the 
former type, he must not only ensure that he possesses the requisite discretionary power (or 
implied authority), but that this must be exercised in good faith.
135
 
Examples of trust funds established in the exercise of his ordinary functions include 
the two funds set up within the Department of Political Affairs, namely the Trust Fund for 
Preventive Action (TFPA) and the Trust Fund for Special Missions and other Activities 
related to Preventive Diplomacy and Peacemaking (UN Special Missions Trust Fund). The 
authority of the Secretary-General to establish these trust funds stems from Article 97 of the 
UN Charter that relates to the capacity of the Secretary-General as the UN’s chief 
administrative officer. Equally, this authority is also derived explicitly from Regulation 4.13 
and Rule 104.3 of the UN’s Financial Regulations and Rules and the Secretary-General’s 
own Bulletin on the Establishment and Management of Trust Funds. The governing law of 
the two trusts is their respective Terms of Reference, which in turn refer to the now-defunct 
Regulations 6.6 and 6.7 of the UN Financial Regulations.
136
 Both trust funds are administered 
by the Secretary-General and all contributions thereto are of a voluntary nature.  
In this manner, the Secretary-General also established the Trust Fund to Assist States 
in the Settlement of Disputes through the International Court of Justice. This trust fund was 
set up unilaterally in 1989 by the Secretary-General following consultations with the 
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President of the ICJ.
137
 The legal basis of the fund, besides Article 97 of the UN Charter, is 
derived also from Articles 1(1) – on the purposes of the UN – and 33 of the UN Charter, 
which refers to the various means of dispute settlement among States.
138
 It necessarily 
follows that in order to promote the ICJ as a forum for the peaceful settlement of disputes, the 
creation of a trust fund to which developing States would have access to defray the cost of 
their expenses, squarely fits the purposes and objectives of the Charter and the functions of 
the Secretary-General. As a result, both the ICJ and the Secretary-General possess implied 
power to set up a trust fund (besides the Secretariat’s powers under the UN’s Financial 
Regulations), as the promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes via the ICJ does not fall 
within the exclusive competence of any UN principal organ.  
In accordance with Article 6 of the Terms of Reference of the ICJ Trust Fund, the 
Secretary-General is its administrator (trustee). Much like all other UN trust funds this is also 
subject to the Organisation’s Financial Regulations and Rules. Despite the existence of a 
panel of experts in Article 9 of the Terms of Reference, this entity is not meant to substitute 
the Secretariat’s trustee function. Its role is to provide expert advice with regard to those 
developing State applicants that merit financing by the fund.
139
 Contributions to the trust fund 
by potential donors can be made by bank transfer or by cheque.
140
 There are situations where 
the Secretary-General is requested by either the Assembly or the Council to set up a non-
elaborate trust fund in the form of a special account. In this case the Secretary-General is 
acting under Article 98 of the Charter, as well as in accordance with UN Financial Regulation 
4.13, and for all practical purposes it is the Assembly that must justify the establishment of 
the fund through its implied powers.
141
 A notable example is the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) Trust Fund, created by the Secretariat following a request by the 
General Assembly.
142
 In the Terms of Reference of the ITLOS Trust Fund, the Assembly’s 
implied powers were confirmed on the basis of Article 287 of the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS),
143
 which much like the relevant provisions of the UN Charter exhort 
States to settle their disputes through ITLOS.
144
 An additional reason was the establishment 
by the Secretary-General of a similar fund for the ICJ.
145
 Although the primary legal basis for 
the establishment of the ITLOS Trust Fund was the institutional act of the UN Secretariat, the 
Agreement on Cooperation and Relationship between the UN and ITLOS provided the grease 
                                                 
137
 UN Doc. A/44/PV.43 (1989), pp 7-11; see Report of the ICJ on the Secretary-General’s Trust Fund, UN Doc. 
A/47/444 (7 Oct 1992), Annex, Terms of Reference of the ICJ Trust Fund. 
138
 P H F Bekker, International Legal Aid in Practice: The ICJ Trust Fund, (1993) 87 AJIL 659, p 661; besides 
the establishment of the ITLOS Trust Fund, the Permanent Court of Arbitration set up in 1995 its own Financial 
Assistance Fund as a means of promoting peaceful dispute settlement. See ILAAB Committee on Transnational 
Dispute Resolution, A Study and Evaluation of the UN Secretary-General’s Trust Fund to Assist States in the 
Settlement of Disputes through the ICJ, reprinted in (2002) 2 Chinese JIL 234, pp 250-53. 
139
 Equally so in the case of the ITLOS Trust Fund Terms of Reference, Art 8. Some authors argue that one of 
the reasons why developing countries have been denied access to international justice relates to cost. Hence, 
trust funds that help defray such costs enhance the pursuit of international justice. See C Claypoole, Access to 
International Justice: A Review of the Trust Funds Available for Law of the Sea-Related Disputes, (2008) 23 
Int’l J Marine & Coastal L 77. 
140
 Report of the SG on the ICJ Trust Fund, UN Doc. A/59/372 (21 Sep 2004). 
141
 This requirement is raised, albeit in cursory and unclear terms, by UN Financial Regulation 4.14, which 
states that “the purpose and limits of each trust fund and special account shall be clearly defined by the 
appropriate authority”. 
142
 GA Res 55/7 (27 Feb 2001), operative paras 9 and 10. In operative para 45 an additional request was made 
for the establishment of a second trust fund with the aim of assisting developing and small-island States in 
attending the meetings of the consultative process (Annex II to GA Res 55/7). 
143
 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. 
144
 ITLOS Trust Fund Terms of Reference, Art 1(1), Annex I to GA Res 55/7. 
145
 Id, Art 1(2). 
in the wheels of the Fund.
146
 Article 10 of the Agreement exhorts the parties to collaborate as 
far as practicably possible in order to achieve coordination and uniformity in their financial 
and administrative operations, albeit without making any reference to the trust fund. The 
Agreement between the two entities, although itself not a decisive criterion for the existence 
of the Trust Fund, is significant because it demonstrates that some aspects of collaboration of 
entities within the UN system is not always straightforward enough to be settled through 
Assembly resolutions or the utilisation of implied or other powers.
147
 
 
 
Ownership of the Trust’s Assets 
 
When Joseph Gold was discussing in his 1978 article the issue of ownership over the assets 
of a trust fund he was referring to the IMF as a trust entity that is administered by the IMF as 
a trustee. He had no problem, therefore, concluding that the IMF as trustee possessed rights 
of ownership over the Fund’s resources, albeit in a manner that these are clearly divisible 
between the trustee and the beneficiaries.
148
 Unlike the absence of equitable beneficiary 
rights in respect of intergovernmental trust funds, the IMF’s beneficiaries are the States 
parties to its Articles of Agreement. This constitutes, therefore, an exception to the general 
rule, according to which named beneficiaries are absent from the administration/donor 
agreements. There is no specific mention to ownership in the World Bank’s trust funds 
operational policies, or the Financial Regulations of the UN and the UNDP. However, it 
should be recognised as a general principle of, at least, the domestic law concept of trusts that 
trust ownership of the trust’s assets passes to the trustee upon appointment and transfer.149 
This is a special type of ownership and although it is beyond the purview and expertise of this 
book to discuss the legal nature of this type of ownership in its domestic setting, it is 
essentially an ownership of assets held in trust. That is, the trustee is their legal owner until 
such time, and under the terms of the trust instrument – or the trustee’s discretion, whatever 
the case may be – that the trustee disburses the trust’s assets to the intended beneficiaries. It is 
an inherent operation in the law of trusts that the trustee is the ipso facto owner (in trust) of 
the trust’s assets. Adversely, in an agency relationship, the agent (equivalent to the trustee in 
a trust relationship) would not normally come to own the funds given him by the appointing 
party, unless this was the express intention of the parties.
150
 A significant advantage in a trust 
ownership of assets is that in case of liquidation of the property and assets of the trustee, that 
which is held in trust may not be subjected to liquidation in order to satisfy the trustee’s 
creditors. 
The application of this general principle to trust funds established under international 
law seems sensible in terms of current legal practice and also for practical reasons. The 
operation of an intergovernmental trust fund typically commences from the moment the first 
donor transfers his contribution to the designated commercial bank account – although even 
prior to this event the entity of the trust fund will generally have come into existence. This 
account will have been credited to the trustee under his name or under the name of the 
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particular trust and intended that it be held under the particular ownership of the trustee. In 
the case of tangible assets, particularly money and monetary instruments, one cannot talk of 
their transfer from one entity to another in terms other than ownership being passed to the 
transferee. It may be, of course, that the transferor wishes such ownership to persist for a 
specified duration or for a particular purpose; such ownership of assets will, therefore, be 
conditional. The same conditional nature is applicable to money held in trust by trustees 
appointed by a treaty, if this indeed represents the wish of the donors. 
The practice of a good number of trust instruments and administration agreements 
indicates that contracting parties expressly acknowledge this general principle of ownership 
in their trust relationship, other than by common understanding. Two types of trustee 
ownership are described in the various instruments. The first comprises those in which the 
trustee is authorised to establish an account in his name and which is to be credited to the 
trustee and designated as such. This represents the practice of IMF trust instruments and a 
standard clause is generally employed.
151
 The other type consists of clauses in the trust’s 
terms of reference or in the administration agreement whereby the trustee is named “legal 
owner [and in that capacity shall] hold in trust the funds, assets and receipts which constitute 
the Fund”.152 Whether or not the matter of ownership is specifically described or implied in a 
trust or other instrument, it must be taken for granted that if it is the intention of the parties to 
establish a trust fund then ownership of monetary assets belonging to the trust entity passes to 
the trustee. The same is generally true with regard to non-monetary assets, such as supplies, 
equipment and other property that belongs to the trust fund.
153
 
At least two significant issues arise as a result of the trustee assuming ownership of 
the fund’s resources. The first concerns the very status of ownership itself once the fund 
instrument’s life cycle comes to an end, or indeed when it is terminated by anyone of the 
parties. As a general rule, administration agreements contain a termination clause with an end 
date for the project that is subject to renewal upon written agreement between the parties. 
Termination clauses, moreover, stipulate that any remaining trust fund assets, including 
accrued investment income, shall be returned to the donors on a pro rata basis within a 
particular time frame following termination.
154
 Equally, unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, in the event of early termination any agreement entered into by third parties and the 
trustee, particularly where the trustee is an international development bank, shall not be 
legally affected.
155
 The other major issue concerns the protection of the trust fund’s property 
against third parties. This is one of the most significant reasons for the use of the trust model 
in which the trustee is generally an intergovernmental organisation, whether an international 
development bank, such as the World Bank, or a specialised UN agency. From the moment 
the trust fund’s resources pass into the ownership of the trustee, said resources are not subject 
to taxation,
156
 in accordance with the respective Headquarters Agreement entered into by the 
Organisation and the host State. This privilege could be further extended to encompass all 
those States with whom said Organisation/trustee has an agreement that precludes it from 
paying tax. Apart from tax and other privileges the trust’s resources, now forming an integral 
part of the Organisation’s self-owned resources, enjoy the immunities of that entity in full, 
subject to this author’s reservations on abusive intergovernmental trust arrangements. 
Although this most probably constitutes a logical implication with regard to the extension of 
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the trustee’s immunity, a good number of administration agreements and trust terms of 
reference specifically incorporate the extension of such immunity over the assets of the 
administered trust.
157
 It may be argued that by doing so and subjecting trust resources to the 
immunities and privileged regime of the international financial institution that is acting as 
trustee in fact constitutes an abuse of that entity’s powers. This criticism is only valid where 
the founding treaty of the trustee does not give rise to an explicit or implied power to set up 
trust funds and where, moreover, it does not subject the ownership of their resources to the 
trustee.
158
 This author is not aware of any such express limitations. In any event, such 
immunity is by no means unrestricted and is limited only to public acts of the organisation 
(jure imperii), at least in the particular case of the IBRD.
159
 
There is perhaps a single exception to the trust ownership rule. This involves the 
IMF’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative 
(MDRI) trust funds and particularly the practice of donors (creditors) therein to absolve debt 
through the conclusion of bilateral agreements with the beneficiaries (debtors). In such cases, 
the debt is not transferred or sold to the trustee by the creditors and as a result the trustee does 
not hold it as an asset on behalf of the donors. 
On the basis of the aforementioned consistency in the practice of States through their 
donor agreements with international organisations acting as trustees, these principles must be 
deemed as having passed beyond any doubt into the realm of customary international law. 
This includes the principle that trust assets are in the trust ownership of the trustee and that 
they are covered by his privileges and immunities.
160
 
 
 
 
Liabilities of Intergovernmental Trusts 
 
The notion of liability concerns the relationship of an entity with both its contracting 
counterparts and those third parties that have suffered from an unlawful act, or a debt, which 
was caused by an act or omission that may be attributed directly or indirectly to the said 
entity. In international law the attribution of liability is connected with the activities of actors 
possessing a substantial degree of international legal personality; thus, States and full 
international organisations. Customary law suggests that whereas the existence of damage is 
not a necessary ingredient in the attribution of State or international organisation 
responsibility, an unlawful act certainly is, when committed by the organs of said entity or its 
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designated agents.
161
 The enjoyment of immunity by actors possessing full international legal 
personality does not necessarily extinguish their liability where an internationally unlawful 
act has taken place, nor obviously where they have incurred a debt; rather, it may serve to 
restrict in certain cases the impeachment of those actors before national courts, but only 
under particular circumstances and in respect of particular forms of liability. The underlying 
principle regarding the liability of international organisations is that where responsibility is in 
fact incurred by the legal person it is not shared by those members that set up the organisation 
in the first place. This principle was clearly advocated in the complex Tin Council litigations, 
which concerned the debts of the International Tin Council, a full international organisation 
with headquarters in London, against private debtors at a time when the organisation itself 
had financially collapsed and was in the process of liquidation. The creditors turned to the 
International Tin Council’s member States for the outstanding debts, but ultimately the House 
of Lords affirmed that the Council possessed a personality that was distinct from that of its 
members and that consequently the contractual obligations assumed by the Council did not 
give rise to liability of its constituent member States, which were viewed as non-parties to the 
transactions of the Tin Council.
162
 As a result of their third party nature the International Tin 
Council’s member States could not be held liable for the debts that the Council itself had 
incurred on account of its operations. 
The international law pertinent to the liability of international organisations is relevant 
only in certain respects to intergovernmental trusts. Firstly, few trusts enjoy a distinct 
international legal personality, let alone the status of international organisations; secondly, 
the law under discussion was developed to deal only with such organisations. These are the 
apparent limitations. Nonetheless, the parties to intergovernmental trusts are generally 
concerned about their personal liability and not about that of the trust entity and it is exactly 
this type of liability that they attempt to extinguish through the trust paradigm. Finally, in the 
absence of any concrete rules applicable to the liability of intergovernmental trusts, the law 
relating to international organisations may be employed by reason of analogy.
163
 Moreover, 
given that the trustees to intergovernmental trusts are typically international organisations, to 
which all contractual powers have been granted, the liabilities of the trustee and the trust will 
readily be subjected to general international law. The following paragraphs of this section 
attempt to explore the liability of trust entities on the basis of their legal organisation and 
degree of legal personality. 
In the case of trust funds that possess full international legal personality this principle 
is sometimes highlighted in the trusts’ constitutional documents. Article 6 of the Agreement 
Establishing the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC), itself a trust fund,
164
 states that “no 
member shall be liable, by reason only of its membership, for acts or obligations of the 
                                                 
161
 B Graefrath, Responsibility and Damages Caused: Relationship between Responsibility and Damages 185 
(1984-II) RCADI 1, pp 34ff. See also ILC Commentary on Articles on State Responsibility, (2001) YB ILC vol 
II (Part II), p 56. 
162
 J H Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry and Others and related appeals; 
MacLaine Watson & Co Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry; MacLaine Watson & Co Ltd v International 
Tin Council (judgment of 26 Oct 1989), 81 ILR 670, per Lord Templeman, p 678. These will be referred to as 
the International Tin Council cases. 
163
 In fact, the ILC Rapporteur on the Responsibility of International Organisations commented that the ICJ’s 
approach in the Lagrand case (Germany v USA), Judgment, (2001) ICJ Rep, para 77, according to which 
individuals are also subjects of international law may lead the Court to assert the legal personality also of non-
governmental organisations. J Gaja, First Report on Responsibility of International Organisations, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/532 (26 March 2003), p 9. This is particularly important in respect of the majority of intergovernmental 
funds that lack a distinct legal personality. 
164
 1538 U.N.T.S. 3. Besides the CFC there exist numerous agreements on particular commodities, such as 
sugar, coffee, metals and others. See J E S Fawcett, The Function of Law in Commodity Agreements, (1970) 44 
BYIL 157. 
Fund”. This is certainly not a declaration of full, but only partial, absolution from liability, 
which no doubt supports the theory of secondary member-State responsibility. This line of 
thinking suggests that the injured party must first present its claim against the organisation to 
the legal person of that organisation and only proceed against its member States where the 
organisation was in default in providing an adequate remedy.
165
 This view (i.e. that the 
creditors can turn against the constituent members in the second instance) was also expressed 
in terms of satisfying the dictates of justice and substantive fairness by some of the Lords in 
the Tin Council cases,
166
 but whereas its ethical dimension is doubtless its legal foundation 
and juridical substantiation is uncertain, albeit it is certainly plausible under particular 
circumstances.
167
 The wording of Article 6 of the CFC Agreement suggests that its member 
States may in fact suffer liability if by their individual action they commit an unlawful act or 
incur a debt which is attributable to the CFC.
168
 It is open to interpretation whether a member 
State may be additionally liable for the debts or other liabilities of the organisation,
169
 absent 
an unlawful act or omission on its part. The answer in the specific case must be negative, 
because attribution of liability to a member State without the element of fault presupposes the 
existence of liability on the basis of membership alone, which is negated in Article 6 of the 
CFC Agreement. 
In both the Tin Council cases and the Westland Helicopters case
170
 the incorporation 
or not of a limitation of liability clause was considered central to the question of separate 
member State liability. Nonetheless, although none of the two organisations possessed such a 
clause in their respective treaties, neither the House of Lords nor the Swiss Federal Supreme 
Court entertained the notion that the constituent States of an organisation may be liable for 
the debts and liabilities of the international legal person.
171
  
In the context of domestic law, a contractual undertaking between a trust fund 
organised in the form of an international organisation and a private party would be subject to 
private law, save for the trust’s immunity from jurisdiction and the separate liability of the 
trust’s member States, which are matters clearly governed by international law. Hence, 
whereas the constitutive treaty of a trust fund that absolves members of separate liability is 
applicable vis-à-vis the trust’s contractual undertakings with private parties, a clause in the 
treaty the effect of which is to limit the trust’s liability generally (i.e. the liability of the legal 
person of the trust alone) would have to be assessed in accordance with the domestic law of 
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the State where the transaction took place, or the locus of the headquarters of the 
organisation. It is, however, doubtful that any jurisdiction would be willing to absolve an 
international organisation for all its privately incurred debts. 
In the case of a quasi-international organisation, such as the Global Fund for AIDS, 
TB and Malaria, the situation is different. Although the Swiss government conferred 
international legal personality to the Global Fund through their respective HQ Agreement, 
Article 5 of said Agreement exempted from immunity of legal process, inter alia, “counter 
claims directly related to principal proceedings initiated by the Fund”, arbitration awards 
between itself and Switzerland, as well as “disputes arising out of contracts and disputes of a 
private law character to which the Global Fund is a party”.172 Moreover, in an independent 
legal opinion delivered under instructions from the Fund by expert counsel in Swiss civil law, 
it was noted that the status of the Fund as a foundation under the Swiss Civil Code entailed its 
liability towards third parties in the same manner as any other Swiss private foundation,
173
 
while its registration with the Trade Register rendered it subject to potential bankruptcy 
proceedings.
174
 Furthermore, in accordance with the Swiss Civil Code “an individual member 
of the [Fund] would incur a personal liability for torts only if it were established that such 
individual, acting purposely or by negligence, infringed personally a provision of law or 
violated an absolute right of a third person, and in doing so, caused damages”.175 This 
provision refers to physical persons and is not applicable to States that are parties to the 
Global Fund. Given that the Fund is not an international organisation and that therefore its 
member States cannot hide behind a corporate veil, any unlawful act caused, or debt incurred, 
by them will trigger the responsibility of that State and possibly the civil liability of the Fund. 
It is clear that the financial resources and other assets of the Global Fund that are held by its 
trustee, the IBRD, cannot be made the subject of private legal proceedings because on the 
basis of the trust agreement with the IBRD ownership of the assets has passed to the World 
Bank. Moreover, it is self-evident that the Global Fund will be amenable to civil proceedings 
as a legal entity, as well as separately through anyone of its members or personnel, in 
countries outside Switzerland, depending on the laws of those countries, unless the Fund 
enters into HQ or other agreements to the contrary.
176
 
The liability of trust funds incorporated as limited international organisations is 
prescribed by their constitutional treaty, their HQ Agreement and general international law. 
The 1992 Convention establishing the International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
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Damage (IOPCF)
177
 makes no mention to the Fund’s liability as a purported “international 
organisation”, apart from the obligation of the Fund to compensate victims for oil spills 
caused by its members and then only on their behalf and not with its own assets.
178
 The only 
reference to liability is found in Articles 5 and 23(a) of the Fund’s HQ Agreement with the 
UK, which on the basis of customary international law provides no exemptions from liability 
in respect of the Fund’s contractual undertakings or civil wrongs. Headquarters Agreements 
can significantly limit or expand the ambit of the trust’s range of liabilities.179  
Trust accounts (i.e. trusts organised very simply around a bank account and lacking 
other organisational structures) and trust funds established under the implied powers of an 
organ within an international organisation and lacking an independent legal personality are 
incapable of assuming liabilities under both domestic and international law.  While for 
accounting purposes they will be considered as distinct from the other accounts administered 
by their trustee or administrative agent, any debts incurred as a result of their management 
will be subsumed within the general liability of the administering authority (which is highly 
unlikely), unless the trustee has incurred the debts and liabilities in the name of the trust fund. 
In practice, the trustee will generally contract in the name of the trust account and all 
liabilities will be debited thereto until the depletion of its assets. 
The trustee will be responsible to the donors and the trust for the fulfilment of the 
tasks entrusted upon him. The law applicable to assess said liability will rarely, if at all, be 
defined in the trust or donor agreements, but given the treaty character of the majority of such 
agreements it is fair to assume that the process of liability will be governed by international 
law. Where the trust fund or the donor is not a State or an international organisation the law 
governing liability will usually be that of the seat of the trustee. The trustee will seek 
invariably to insert standardised limitation of liability clauses in the relevant agreements, but 
depending on the amounts of committed assets this type of clause will not always be 
acceptable to the trust or the donor. In the case of the World Bank, reference will be made by 
the Bank to the provisions of its relevant operational manuals given that it is unable to violate 
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or circumvent its own institutional law.
180
 International financial institutions when acting as 
trustees employ the “same duty of care [to their own affairs]” standard,181 but occasionally 
they have to use more extensive language to limit their potential liability. By way of example, 
Article 9 of the Agreement between the Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau and the IBRD/IDA 
concerning the German Consultant Trust Fund stipulates among others that the Bank “shall 
not be subject to any other duties or responsibilities to the donor, including, without 
limitation, any duties or obligations that might otherwise apply to a fiduciary or trustee under 
general principles of trust or fiduciary law”.182 Given that this agreement envisaged from its 
very title the formation of a trust vehicle, the renunciation of fiduciary or trustee obligations 
by the Bank is at odds with its contractual undertaking.  
It is not only the trustee that may choose to absolve himself of prospective liabilities 
through his agreement with the  donor, but also the donor himself. This observation is 
particularly significant in light of trust accounts that do not possess any independent legal 
personality and thus any liability in respect of their assets is to be found in the agreements 
between the donor(s) and the trustee. Article 8(2) of the Denmark/IBRD ASEM-EU Asian 
Financial Crisis Response Fund states that: 
 
Otherwise than for failure to perform its obligations set forth in this Agreement, the Donor will not under any 
circumstances whatever be liable for damages caused either to the Bank or third parties during the performance 
of this Agreement. No claim can be submitted to the Donor for compensation or for restoration of any such 
damage or loss.
183
 
 
In the case of trust funds the implementation of whose objectives befalls a number of entities, 
all of which possess international legal personality, the parties involved may seek to limit 
their general liability by expressly stating that none is the agent of the other and that each 
party is liable for his own actions – absent contributory acts or omissions.184 
 I will not be addressing in this article the issue of the trust’s immunity, principally 
because this matter will be subsumed under the immunities of the trustee, where the trust 
does not have a distinct obligation from that of the trustee. What, however, remains unclear is 
the ascertainment of the public (jure imperii) or commercial (jure gestionis) nature of the 
trust or the trustee’s act in each case. Ordinarily, given that the very purpose of the trusts 
surveyed in this article is to fulfil a charitable or humanitarian objective, all their 
undertakings should be viewed as public acts. This approach, however, fails to take into 
account the following factors: a) the trustee receives a commission for his services; b) the 
trustee is required to invest the trust’s assets; c) the donors may expect to receive a 
commercial benefit from the operations of the trust, such as credits under the UNFCC’s 
Clean Development Mechanism. Academic opinion and judicial developments seem to 
favour distinguishing between the public and private acts of international organisations, albeit 
the view is not unanimous.
185
 Although neat analogies are incompatible with the nature of 
trust funds, it is not without merit to argue that on account of the fact that the trustee is an 
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international organisation or because the trust moreover operates through a complex 
governance mechanism the same principles should apply mutatis mutantis to trust funds. The 
complexity of the matter requires much more rigorous analysis than I can offer in this section. 
 
 
 
The Donors’ Personal Liability: A Challenge to the Contractual Orthodoxy 
 
One of the principal reasons for setting up trust funds, rather than making direct unilateral 
monetary contributions, is the intention by the donors to limit all liability arising as a result of 
an activity that entails the provision of financial assistance to development or other projects 
worldwide. It is true that a donor could, in the case of bilateral assistance agreements, limit 
the range of his liability by introducing an appropriate clause therein, but this does not mean 
that the donor is free from all liability where other rules of State responsibility of a 
peremptory character come into operation. For example, if a donor were to establish a power 
plant in a developing State that is subsequently found to be faulty (assuming this was known 
to the donor from the outset and hidden from the recipient State) and which pollutes the 
waterways of that State, as well as those of its neighbours, the limitation clause in the 
bilateral agreement will not shield the donor from assuming liability. This liability is extra-
contractual and can be claimed not only by the “assisted” target State, but also from all other 
States that have sustained harm as a result of the relevant injury – although evidence of harm 
is not necessary for the purposes of State responsibility. It is certainly interesting that the 
presumption among developed States that contribute financial resources as donors to 
intergovernmental trust funds is that as a result of the express or implicit limitation clause in 
the donor agreements they can never incur any liability from the operations of the trust fund. 
This presumption must necessarily be premised on the particular understanding that the 
intergovernmental trust model excludes the contributing States from all liability, in a way that 
is akin to the exclusion of liability in respect of member States to international organisations. 
Nonetheless, this assumption has never been tested in practice and there is no valid 
justification for approximating the liability of trust donors to that of international 
organisations’ member States. The main reason for this conclusion is that international 
organisations enjoy distinct international legal personality from that of their members, 
whereas the vast majority of intergovernmental trust funds do not.
186
 It should be noted that 
none of the provisions in the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility clearly encompass the 
liability of the donors for unlawful acts committed by the trust or the trustee. To do so, the 
Articles would have had to cater for situations where an international organisation, or other 
entity, commits an internationally wrongful act at the behest of a State without itself being an 
agent of that State.
187
 Thus, Articles 55 and 57 of the ILC’s Articles apply as a residual 
clause, according to which other general international law will govern cases not covered by 
them. 
The fact that the assets of the trust fund are subsumed under the legal personality of 
the UN or the World Bank only serves to shield those assets, but this does not mean that the 
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distinct legal person of the trustee also shields the donors from liability. Certainly, if, on the 
basis of global consent, a rule of customary international law were to be borne, which,  
served to remove all subsequent liability from donors to intergovernmental trust funds, this 
would negate my aforementioned conclusion under the lex posterior rule. This author is of 
the opinion that while a customary rule that negates donor liability is beginning to crystallise, 
it is not of a nature that excludes all liability from the person of the donor, nor of course of 
the trustee. Simply put, express or implicit limitation clauses in trust agreements protect the 
donor to the extent that his financial contribution is not knowingly provided for an unlawful 
purpose and where his agreement with the trustee and any implementing agency equally does 
not give rise to an unlawful act.
188
 It is taken for granted in every case that the recipient 
beneficiary accepts the limitation clause in the trust agreement by means of its consent of the 
grant agreement with the trustee, irrespective of whether this is in the form of a treaty or a 
MoU. 
 There are situations in which the donor State and the trustee can never claim to be free 
from liability as a result of the trust’s operations.189 Here, I shall mention two situations, but 
it is not improbable that there are more. The first concerns those situations in which the donor 
has not only deposited his financial contribution with the trustee, but has moreover engaged 
himself actively in the operations of the trust by participating in its decision-making body. In 
those cases where the trust in question is not an intergovernmental organisation the 
participation of the donor in the executive organ of the trust vehicle entails potential liability 
that may be satisfied not only from the assets and property of the trust, but also from the 
assets of the donor. It would defy all notions of justice were the donor to possess executive 
authority in respect of a fund that is devoid of international legal personality and yet bear no 
liability whatsoever for acts that are intentionally and manifestly unlawful.
190
 This would 
certainly constitute a gross abuse of the trust vehicle and it is wholly unlikely that the 
emerging customary international law of trust funds has permitted such an exception to the 
general rule of State responsibility. The second situation that gives rise to the donor’s 
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personal State responsibility, as opposed to the sole responsibility of the trust entity, involves 
those cases where the contribution of the donor causes harm to third parties. We have already 
demonstrated examples stemming from the implementation of disbursements (e.g. knowingly 
constructing a faulty power plant). 
Equally, however, there is little justification in the donor simply providing money for 
a trust whose functions and operations he either does not care about, or in respect of which he 
foresees that they are likely to breed widespread corruption, sustain authoritarian rule, distort 
regional competition, or directly injure neighbouring States in some other way.
191
 What is the 
likely legal basis for the exclusion of donor liability in these cases, given that the act of 
contribution is directly linked to the perpetration of unlawful acts? The only justification 
offered by the donors as a matter of exculpation seems to be the intergovernmental trust 
model itself,
192
 but this is exactly the basis of the problem and absent a convincing and 
unambiguous customary rule it certainly cannot constitute the solution to our conundrum. It is 
evident that irrespective of the answer to the aforementioned problems, the trust relationship 
cannot shield the donor from injury caused to third States as a result of operations directly 
attributed to the donor’s contribution, given that the limitation clause does not operate against 
third parties to the trust agreement.
193
  
I am similarly dissuaded by the argument that the donor should bear no liability in 
cases where his contribution sows a range of foreseen, but not directly intentional, calamities 
in the territory of the target State, or in respect of its interests. Certainly, were the donor was 
able to demonstrate that the injury was unforeseeable or that every care was taken in 
consultation with the trustee to avoid the injury, all of which was conducted and undertaken 
in good faith with the additional consent of the target State, the donor’s potential liability 
would be significantly mitigated and most probably erased. It is, therefore, prudent for 
prospective donors to undertake serious due diligence exercises prior to making a pledge or 
contribution to a trust fund, although in practice it is unlikely, or at least rare, that the target 
State will make claims directly against a donor. In theory, if one admits that a particular trust 
fund set up to assist developing States was poorly monitored and helped an already 
authoritarian regime to purchase arms and stifle democracy, a succeeding democratic 
government should be able to claim damages against the donors for directly contributing to 
the denial of internal self-determination and the breeding of corruption. It is, nonetheless, 
evident that the issues explored and raised in this section are by no means clear, or amenable 
to straightforward answers. This discussion is aided by reference to a particular case study in 
the next section which I believe constitutes a clear example of an abusive trust that should not 
benefit from any of the customary traits of the intergovernmental trust paradigm. There is no 
doubt that in practice the vast majority of beneficiaries will be disinclined from claiming 
damages against the donors under the circumstances described in this section out of fear that 
the funding may cease altogether. 
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 This is even more so since under the emerging customary law of intergovernmental trust funds the assets of 
the trust are only in the legal (or trust) ownership of the trustee. In reality, therefore, the contributing States 
actually own those assets. 
Abusive Trusts: The Fine Line between International Trust, International Agency and 
Partnership Arrangements 
 
The relative underdevelopment of international trust law struggles to draw the boundaries 
between agency and the international sui generis trust relationship. In national legal systems 
statute law and the courts clearly establish this boundary, which is operable irrespective of 
any self-characterisation of the relevant relationship by the settlors as to its legal form, on the 
basis of their mutual agreement. In international law, the contributors may wish to designate 
the respective vehicle as a trust fund in order to avoid personal liability, or to avoid the 
subjection of their contributions to the securities law of the lex forum, as well as the 
imposition of domestic taxation, inter alia, despite the fact that the relationship established 
leaves no room for the trustee to reach independent judgment as to his fiduciary duties 
towards the trust’s beneficiaries. The situation becomes more complicated and somewhat 
untenable where the instrument of the purported trust vehicle makes no claim to distribute 
assets or revenues to third party beneficiaries, at least directly, but only to the contributors 
themselves.  
This is precisely the case with the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF), which was set up 
under an initiative of the World Bank in order to attract companies and governments from 
developed States with a view to offsetting their carbon emissions through the establishment 
of carbon-free projects in the developing world in the form of earned credits.
194
 The idea was 
truly innovative and the trust vehicle contemplated was eventually comprised of a three-tier 
governance structure, at the apex of which stand two equally powerful bodies, the 
Participants’ Meeting and the Participants’ Committee. The Meeting possesses the function 
of an assembly, save that it has the power to review the operations of the Fund and that of 
existing projects and provide the trustee with “general policy and strategic guidance” on all 
the operations of the Fund, including the budget.
195
 In short, the Meeting possess absolute 
decision-making authority to which the trustee is obliged to adhere. From its very nature this 
allocation of power in respect of the PCF is wholly antithetical to the World Bank’s general 
trustee functions. The Participants’ Committee is but a different emanation of the Meeting, in 
that it is mandated with a more practical role that involves taking the day-to-day decisions 
and implementing the policy and guidance of the Meeting on the ground.
196
 Unlike the 
Meeting that is comprised of representatives of all contributing participants, involving State 
parties to the Kyoto Protocol,
197
 but more significantly private enterprises, the Committee 
comprises only seven participants, four of which are members of public sector participants, 
whereas the remaining three are derived from the private sector.
198
 This structure conforms to 
a relative equality of the parties, which is further reinforced by the voting scheme that 
introduces the rule of one vote for each US dollar of contribution to the Fund in respect of the 
Meeting.
199
 The rule of one vote per participant applies with regard to the Committee.
200
 On 
the other hand, the trustee shall hold the assets in trust and is endowed with authority to 
manage the assets, as well as conclude participation agreements and enter into contracts that 
promote the objectives of the Fund.
201
 The trustee is moreover authorised to invest the assets 
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of the Fund “in such manner as [he] may decide … as are authorised investments for other 
trust fund assets maintained by [the World Bank Group]”.202 
It is clear from the very objective of the Prototype Carbon Fund that it involves a 
bilateral, rather than a trilateral, relationship. Typical trust funds comprise a settlor (or 
donor), a trustee and third-party beneficiaries, whereas the Carbon Fund lacks such 
beneficiaries, given that the participating States infuse money into the Fund with a view to 
gaining future emission credits. Certainly, an argument can be made that the Host Countries 
and their peoples benefit from this scheme through the projects set up therein by the 
participants. However, this hardly qualifies them as direct beneficiaries of the Carbon Fund.  
Moreover, the IBRD as trustee to the Carbon Fund is not empowered to take any decisions 
outside the parameters set by the Participants’ Meeting. The Instrument devotes a very long 
provision to the trustee’s powers,203 but these are of a purely administrative nature and do not 
go beyond managing and implementing the day-to-day administrative functions of the Fund. 
Furthermore, the authority of the trustee in respect of certain functions is severely curtailed 
by the express terms of the Instrument.
204
 The limitation of the trustee’s powers to make 
decisions as to the allocation process and its statutory inability to take action on the basis of 
its own judgment in the best interests of a predefined class of beneficiaries renders the status 
of the Carbon Fund somewhat conspicuous.
205
 Although the limitation of the trustee’s powers 
may be justified by reference to other trusts whereby the trustee was found to possess no 
decision making powers, in neither of these trusts did the donors expect to gain a financial or 
other direct benefit from the operations of the trust. As a result, it was initially queried even 
within the Bank itself whether the participants’ financial contributions thereto amounted in 
fact to securities, in which case the Fund was not to be viewed as a trust and the Bank’s role 
would best be construed as that of a managing agent.  
The crucial question therefore was whether or not the participants’ contribution 
amounted to a security under US federal law, which involves an investment transaction or 
scheme from which the investor is led to expect possible profits from the actions of the 
promoter or third parties.
206
 Given that the participants expect to gain beneficial interests 
from the operation of the trust these would necessarily assume the character of securities 
under the Howie test as this is applicable to business trusts.
207
 Neither the Bank nor the 
participants wished to have their contributions subjected to US securities law, each for its 
own personal reasons, but certainly none wanted to wait to go through the time consuming 
process of registering with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As a result, 
the Bank decided to proceed with the operations of the Fund, particularly the worldwide 
attraction of participants, by adhering to the “private placement exemption” of the 1933 US 
Securities Exchange Act,
208
 whereby transactions not involving a public offering are exempt 
from the registration obligations warranted under the Act. The application of this exemption 
is possible only where the offer is made to a pre-determined body of offerees with access to 
all the relevant information and who are, moreover, in a capacity to demand and interpret said 
information.
209
 Given that any public advertising involves a public offering,
210
 it was hard to 
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justify the exemption vis-à-vis the Prototype Carbon Fund for which the World Bank had 
initially launched a global campaign to attract participants. This campaign included the 
hosting of conferences, advertisement and an aggressive marketing effort. Consequently, the 
Bank was forced to amend its marketing strategy and limit all actions that may have 
otherwise been interpreted as constituting a public offering, even going as far as dismantling 
its public website that was subsequently replaced by a new encrypted one accessible only to 
the participants.
211
 Smyth is of the opinion that the Prototype Carbon Fund, despite its agency 
or partnership-looking legal structure, should be viewed as a trust fund regulated under 
international law on the basis that the trustee is not a for-profit institution and many 
participants are sovereign States.
212
 This is probably not, however, the best criterion for 
ascertaining the legal position of the Fund. The Fund should be assessed on the basis of its 
function, the legal personality of the trustee and its participants, as well as the position of the 
countries where the offsetting credits are purchased. Furthermore, the liabilities of the Fund 
should be assessed objectively in accordance with general international law. If the ultimate 
nature of the Fund’s operations are jure gestionis, and solely for the commercial benefit of 
the participants, its purported public international character cannot seriously be justified. The 
jure imperii character of the Fund, on the other hand, is reinforced by the international legal 
personality of the trustee and its State parties and the environmental objective involved.  
Finally, and this is perhaps the most important observation, even if the States in which 
the Fund operates determine objectively that it is not a trust but an agency arrangement and 
that the participants’ contributions are best described as securities, they may, nonetheless, 
consent to it being self-proclaimed a trust under international law and governed under the 
particular customary law of intergovernmental trusts. They may justify turning a blind eye by 
reference to the international legal personality of the trustee under whose trusteeship the Fund 
is registered and it may also transpire that the trust vehicle best accommodates the interests of 
the States concerned by reason of its environmental incentives and the benefits accruing to 
their corporations. Overall, however, this author is not happy with conferring trust status to 
the PCF for an additional reason. Section 8.1(m) of the Fund’s Instrument astonishingly does 
not preclude the IBRD: 
 
from acting for its own account and from entering into or being interested in any contract or transaction with any 
person, including, but not limited to any participant [etc] with the same rights as it would have had if it were not 
acting as the Trustee, and the IBRD need not account for any profit therefrom. 
 
This function is no doubt incompatible with the function of trustee and gives rise to such 
significant conflicts of interest that raises doubts as to whether the international law of trusts 
should apply at all in this case. It, moreover, sits uncomfortably with the longstanding 
position in the common law whereby the trustee must not compete with those persons to 
whom he owes a duty, or to derive any profit from his role as such or otherwise be seen to 
derive profit.
213
 The implication stemming from this observation is that were the trustee to 
acquire a trust asset, this transaction would generally be voidable even if the trust bears no 
loss.
214
 Overall, in my opinion the PCF constitutes an abuse of the trusteeship process 
envisaged under the international law of trusts and the participation of both the donors and 
the trustee therein clearly gives rise to their personal liability. 
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 Conclusion 
 
I am convinced that the intergovernmental trust model analysed in this article is of a sui 
generis nature. Its fundamental characteristics are the reliance on agreement between trustee 
and donor where its purpose is to confer a benefit on a third party, whether pre-defined or 
not. If the purpose of the trust is to confer financial or other benefits to the donor or the 
trustee through the trust’s assets, the privileges accruing to such trusts should generally be 
viewed as being inapplicable for the simple reason that it would constitute a self-contract. It 
is just and fair that the trust property should enjoy privileges and immunities in the hands of 
the trustee and that the donors limit their liability against third parties, because of the 
benevolent and charitable character of trusts and the lack of personal interest in the person of 
the donor. Any imbalance in this relationship, particularly as regards situations where the 
donor does accumulate financial gains or causes an unlawful act through his contribution, the 
privileges of the trust should not operate to shield him from liability. The same is true in 
respect of the trustee. 
 Although it is true that prospective or designated beneficiaries possess few, if any, 
remedies against the trust entity or the trustee, one of the overarching tenets of 
intergovernmental trust funds is the principle of local ownership. This is meant to empower 
the government and civil society of the target (beneficiary) State with such capacity as to 
implement the trust’s on-the-ground project and take charge of the realisation of its 
objectives. At the very least, trustees must make available quasi-judicial mechanisms, subject 
to their institutional law, by which to allow civil society to report any wrongdoings. The 
amounts of financial resources injected into many trust funds are such that they generate a 
procurement scramble and a general reluctance on recipient States to question the practices of 
implementing agents. There is always a real danger that instead of delivering a viable and 
useful service, some implementing agents are delivering quite the opposite. Trustees must 
give a voice to civil society, given that the local courts of a distressed developing country are 
hardly an adequate forum for addressing these issues. 
 This author is generally weary about characterising ambiguous actions at the 
international level as subject to customary law. Nonetheless, it is hoped that the reader is 
convinced that on account of the overwhelming practice of States in entering into trust 
agreements, trusts headquarters agreements, unilateral donations, as well as from their 
general stance as donors or recipients that certain functions of the trust model are beyond 
doubt part of a globally consistent and coherent practice. This practice is, moreover, 
confirmed by the practice of those international organisations acting as trustees through their 
institutional law. These principles, which have been analysed extensively throughout this 
article, are: a) trusts are based on agreement, whether formal or informal; b) there is no 
requirement that the trust possess any kind of domestic or international legal personality; c) 
the privileges and immunities of the trustee cover also the assets of the trust; d) no personal 
liabilities arise from the operation of the trust for the donors and the trustee, unless they have 
personally caused the infliction of an unlawful act; e) the assets of the trust are in the 
ownership of the trustee; f) none of the above applies where the aim of the trust relationship 
is to materially benefit the donors or the trustee, over and above any benefit to third parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
